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Abstract—Federated learning was proposed with an intriguing
vision of achieving collaborative machine learning among nu-
merous clients without uploading their private data to a cloud
server. However, the conventional framework requires each client
to leverage the full model for learning, which can be prohibitively
inefficient for resource-constrained clients and large-scale deep
learning tasks. We thus propose a new framework, called feder-
ated submodel learning, where clients download only the needed
parts of the full model, namely submodels, and then upload
the submodel updates. Nevertheless, the “position” of a client’s
truly required submodel corresponds to her private data, and
its disclosure to the cloud server during interactions inevitably
breaks the tenet of federated learning. To integrate efficiency
and privacy, we have designed a secure federated submodel
learning scheme coupled with a private set union protocol
as a cornerstone. Our secure scheme features the properties
of randomized response, secure aggregation, and Bloom filter,
and endows each client with a customized plausible deniability,
in terms of local differential privacy, against the position of
her desired submodel, thus protecting her private data. We
further instantiated our scheme with the e-commerce recom-
mendation scenario in Alibaba, implemented a prototype system,
and extensively evaluated its performance over 30-day Taobao
user data. The analysis and evaluation results demonstrate the
feasibility and scalability of our scheme from model accuracy and
convergency, practical communication, computation, and storage
overheads, as well as manifest its remarkable advantages over
the conventional federated learning framework.
Index Terms—federated submodel learning, private set union,
randomized response, local differential privacy, secure aggrega-
tion, Bloom filter, e-commerce recommendation
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Motivating Industrial Scenario in Alibaba
The industrial scenario in Alibaba that motivated federated
submodel learning is the desire to provide customized and ac-
curate e-commerce recommendations for billion-scale clients
while keeping user data on local devices.
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Currently, the recommendation systems in Alibaba are cloud
based and require the server cluster to collect, process, and
store numerous user data. In addition, the deployed recom-
mendation models follow a golden paradigm of embedding1
and Multi-Layer Perceptron (MLP) [3]: user data are first
encoded into high-dimensional sparse feature vectors, then
embedded into low-dimensional dense vectors, and finally fed
into fully connected layers. To improve accuracy, Deep Interest
Network (DIN) [4] introduces the attention mechanism to
activate the user’s historical behaviors, namely relative inter-
ests, with respect to the target item; Deep Interest Evolution
Network (DIEN) [5] further extracts latent interests and mon-
itors interest evolution through Gated Recurrent Unit (GRU)
coupled with attention update gate; and Behavior Sequence
Transformer (BST) [6] incorporates transformer to capture the
sequential signals underlying the user’s behavior sequence.
However, typical fields of user data involved in recom-
mendation include user profile (e.g., user ID, gender, and
age), user behavior (e.g., the list of visited goods IDs and
relevant information, such as category IDs and shop IDs), and
context (e.g., time, page number, and display position). More
or less, these data fields are sensitive, and some clients who
value security and privacy highly may refuse to share their
data. In addition, according to the General Data Protection
Regulation (GDPR), which was legislated by the European
Commission and took effect on May 25, 2018, any institution
or company is prohibited from uploading user data and storing
it in the cloud without the explicit permissions from the
European Union users [7], [8]. Under such circumstances,
refining the recommendation models and further providing
accurate recommendations become urgent demands as well as
thorny challenges in practice.
Federated learning, which decouples the ability to do ma-
chine learning from the need to upload and store data in the
cloud, is a potential solution. However, the original framework
of federated learning, proposed by Google researchers in [9],
requires each client to download the full machine learning
1In general, deep learning with a huge and sparse input space (e.g., e-
commerce goods IDs, natural language texts, and locations) requires an
embedding layer to first transform inputs into a lower-dimensional space [1].
Additionally, the full embedding matrix tends to occupy a large proportion of
the whole model parameters (e.g., 98.22% in our evaluated DIN model and
more than two-thirds in Gboard’s CIFG language model [2]).
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Fig. 1. A visual comparison of conventional federated learning and our new federated submodel learning.
model for training and then to upload the update of the full
model, which is impractical for resource-constrained clients
in the context of complex deep learning tasks. For example,
as the largest online consumer-to-consumer platform in China,
Taobao (owned by Alibaba) has roughly two billion goods in
total [10], which is far larger than the 10,000 word vocabulary
in the natural language scenario of Google’s Gboard [2], [11],
[12]. This implies that the full embedding matrix of goods
has roughly two billion rows and roughly occupies 134GB
of space, when the embedding dimension is 18, and each
element adopts 32-bit representation. If each client directly
uses the full matrix for learning, it inevitably incurs huge
overheads, which are unacceptable and unaffordable for one
billion Taobao users with smart devices. To improve efficiency,
we observe that a certain user tends to browse, click, and buy
a small number of goods, and thus just needs a tailored model,
which can sharply reduce the overheads and is more practical
for mobile clients. Continuing with the above example, if
a Taobao user’s historical data involve 100 goods, she only
requires the corresponding 100 rows, rather than the entire
two billion rows, of the embedding matrix. Based on this
key observation, we propose a new framework of federated
learning, called federated submodel learning, as follows.
B. Framework of Federated Submodel Learning
We plot the workflow of federated submodel learning in
Fig. 1(b) and also provide the traditional federated learning in
Fig. 1(a) for an intuitive comparison.
In the beginning of one communication round, a cloud
server first selects a certain number of eligible clients, typically
end users whose mobile devices are idle, charging, and con-
nected to an unmetered Wi-Fi network. This eligibility criteria
is used to avoid a negative effect on the user experience, data
usage, or battery life. Then, each chosen client downloads part
of the global model as she requires, namely a submodel, from
the cloud server. For example, in the e-commerce scenario
above, a client’s submodel mainly consists of the embedding
parameters for the displayed and clicked goods in her historical
data, as well as the parameters of the other network layers.
Afterwards, the client trains the submodel over her private
data locally. At the end of one round, the cloud server lets
those chosen clients who are still alive upload the updates of
their submodels and further aggregates the submodel updates
to form a consensus update to the global model. Considering
the convergencies of the global model at the cloud server and
the submodels on clients, the above process is iterated for
several rounds.
If each client leverages the full model rather than her re-
quired submodel for learning, federated submodel learning will
degenerate to conventional federated learning. Compared with
the conventional one, our new framework further decouples
the ability to accomplish federated learning from the need to
use the prohibitively large full model, which can dramatically
improve efficiency. For example, in our evaluation, the size of
a client’s desired submodel is only 1.99% of the full model’s
size. Thus, our framework is more practical for resource-
constrained clients and deep learning tasks.
C. Newly Introduced Privacy Risks
Just as every coin has two sides, federated submodel learn-
ing not only brings in efficiency but also introduces extra
privacy risks. On one hand, compared with using the public
full model in conventional federated learning, the download
of a submodel and the upload of the submodel update would
require each client to provide an index set as auxiliary infor-
mation, specifying the “position” of her submodel. However,
the index set normally corresponds to the client’s private data.
For example, to specify the required rows of the embedding
matrix in the e-commerce scenario, a client mainly needs to
provide the goods IDs in her user data as the index set. Thus,
the disclosure of a client’s real index set to the cloud server
can still be regarded as the leakage of the client’s private data,
breaking the tenet of federated learning. On the other hand,
compared with the aligned full model in federated learning,
each client only submits the update of her customized and
highly differentiated submodel in federated submodel learning.
As a result, the aggregation of updates with respect to a certain
index can come from a unique client (e.g., with probability
86.7% for 100 chosen clients in our evaluated Taobao dataset),
which indicates that the cloud server not only can ascertain that
the client has a certain index but also can learn her detailed
update. These two kinds of knowledge both breach the client’s
private data. Further, such a privacy risk in e-commerce is
more severe than that in natural language because compared
with the vocabularies of different Gboard users, the goods
IDs of different Taobao users are more differentiated. We will
detail and visualize the preceding privacy risks in Section III-A
and Fig. 2.
D. Fundamental Problems and Challenges
In essence, to mitigate the above privacy risks, we need
to jointly solve two fundamental problems modeled from the
processes of downloading a submodel and uploading a sub-
model update, respectively. One is how a client can download
a row from a matrix, maintained by an untrusted cloud server,
without revealing which row, alternatively the row index, to
the cloud server. The other is how a client can modify a row of
the matrix, still without revealing which row was modified and
the altered content to the cloud server. Using the terminology
from file system permissions, the first problem has a “read-
only” attribute, where the client only reads the file. In contrast,
the second problem is in a “write” mode, where the client can
edit the file. Further incorporating the obscure requirement of
two operations, the second problem appears more challenging
than the first one. We now analyze these two problems in detail
as follows.
We start with the first problem. One trivial method is that the
client downloads the full matrix, as in conventional federated
learning, and then extracts the required row locally. Although
this method perfectly hides the fetched row index, it incurs
significant communication cost, which can be unaffordable for
resource-constrained mobile devices, especially when the ma-
trix is huge, e.g., representing a deep neural network. To avoid
downloading the full matrix, Private Information Retrieval
(PIR) [13]–[15] can be applied, which exactly matches our
problem settings, including the read-only mode and the privacy
preservation requirement of the retrieved elements. The state-
of-the-art constructions of private information retrieval include
Microsoft’s SealPIR [13] and Labeled PSI [14] and Goolge’s
PSIR [15], where two Microsoft protocols have been deployed
in its Pung private communication system [16]. We note that
another celebrated cryptographic primitive, called Oblivious
Transfer (OT) [17], is stronger than private information re-
trieval. It not only guarantees that the cloud server does not
know which row the client has downloaded, as in private
information retrieval, but also ensures that the client does not
know the other rows of the matrix, which is instead not needed
in practical federated submodel learning. Therefore, if we
consider the first problem independently, private information
retrieval may be a good choice.
We next dissect the second problem. For a concrete row
of the full matrix, if clients modify this row one by one,
the cloud server definitely knows those clients who modified
this row and their detailed contents of modification. Thus, one
feasible way is to first securely aggregate all the modifications
without revealing any individual modification, and then apply
the aggregate modification to the row of the full matrix once.
In particular, such a guarantee can be provided by the secure
aggregation protocol in [18] and some other schemes for
oblivious addition, e.g., based on additively homomorphic
cryptosystems [19]–[21]. With the secure aggregation guar-
antee, if more than one client participates in aggregation and
at least one of their modifications is nonzero, then the cloud
server cannot reveal which client(s) truly intend to modify this
row and their detailed modifications. Further, a larger number
of involved clients implies a stronger privacy guarantee. One
extreme case is in conventional federated learning, which
harshly lets all chosen clients in one communication round
be involved, no matter whether they truly intend to modify
this row or not. Thus, it can offer the best privacy guarantee.
Nevertheless, considering each client needs to be involved
for each row of the full matrix, it is too inefficient to be
applicable in the large-scale deep learning context. Another
extreme case is in federated submodel learning, which simply
lets those clients who really intend to modify this row be
involved. Hence, each chosen client only needs to be involved
for those rows that she truly intends to modify, implying
the best efficiency. However, different clients tend to modify
highly differentiated or even mutually exclusive rows. For the
joint modification with respect to some row, chances are high
that only one client is involved. Under such a circumstance,
the secure aggregation guarantee no longer works, which leaks
the client’s real intention and her detailed modification. In a
nutshell, trivial solutions to the second problem cannot well
balance or support tuning privacy and efficiency.
E. Our Solution Overview and Major Contributions
Jointly considering the above two fundamental problems
and several practical issues, we propose a secure scheme
for federated submodel learning. In our scheme, each chosen
client generates three types of index sets locally: real, per-
turbed, and succinct. First, the real index is extracted from a
client’s private data and is kept secret from the other system
participants, including the cloud server and any other chosen
client. Second, the perturbed index set is used to interact with
others in the download and upload phases. It is generated by
applying randomized response twice with one memoization
step between. Such a design, together with secure aggregation,
allows the client to hold a self-controllable deniability against
whether she really intends or does not intend to download
some row and to upload the modification of this row, even
if the client may be chosen to participate in multiple com-
munication rounds. The strength of deniability is rigorously
quantified using local differential privacy. Further, rather than
trivially using the prohibitively large-scale full index set as the
questionnaire of randomize response in every communication
round, we identify a necessary and sufficient index set, namely
the union of the chosen clients’ real index sets. Considering the
secrecy of each client’s real index set, we propose an efficient
and scalable Private Set Union (PSU) protocol based on Bloom
filter, secure aggregation, and randomization, allowing clients
to obtain the union under the mediation of an untrusted
cloud server without revealing any individual real index set.
In particular, private set union promises a wide range of
applications but receives little attention. Due to unaffordable
overheads, none of the existing protocols can be deployed in
practice yet. Last, the succinct index set is derived from the
intersection between the real and perturbed index sets, and it
is used to prepare the data and submodel for local training.
We summarize our key contributions in this work as follows:
• To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to propose
the framework of federated submodel learning and further
to identify and remedy new privacy risks.
• Our proposed secure scheme mainly features the prop-
erties of randomized response and secure aggregation to
empower each client with a tunable deniability against
her real intention of downloading the desired submodel
and uploading its update, thus protecting her private data.
As a moat, we designed an efficient and scalable private
set union protocol based on Bloom filter and secure
aggregation, which can be of independent and significant
value in practice.
• We instantiated with Taobao’s e-commerce scenario,
adopted Deep Interest Network (DIN) for recommenda-
tion, and implemented a prototype system. Additionally,
we extensively evaluated over one month of Taobao
data. The evaluation and analysis results demonstrate
the practical feasibility of our scheme, as well as its
remarkable advantages over the conventional federated
learning framework in terms of model accuracy and con-
vergency, communication, computation, and storage over-
heads. Specifically, when the number of chosen clients in
one round is 100, compared with conventional federated
learning, which diverges in the end, our scheme improves
the highest Area Under the Curve (AUC) by 0.072.
In addition, at the same security and privacy levels as
conventional federated learning with secure aggregation,
our scheme reduces 80.05% of communication overhead
on both sides of the client and the cloud server. More-
over, our scheme reduces 85.02% (resp., 45.43%) and
72.51% (resp., 63.77%) of computation (resp., memory)
overheads on the sides of the client and the cloud server,
respectively. Furthermore, when the size of the full model
scales further, it does not incur additional overhead to our
scheme, but it prohibits conventional federated learning
from being applied. Finally, for our private set union,
the communication overhead per client is less than 1MB,
and the computation overheads of the client and the cloud
server are both less than 40s, even if the dropout ratio of
the chosen clients reaches 20%.
II. RELATED WORK
In recent years, federated learning has become an active
topic in both academic and industrial fields. In this section,
we briefly review some major focuses and relevant work as
follows. For more related work, we direct interested readers
to the surveys written by Li et al. [22] and Yang et al. [23].
First and most important is to identify and address security
and privacy issues of federated learning. Bonawitz et al. [18]
proposed a secure, communication-efficient, and failure-robust
aggregation protocol in both honest-but-curious and active
adversary settings. It can ensure that the untrusted cloud server
learns nothing but the aggregate (or mathematically, the sum)
of the model updates contributed by chosen clients, even if
part of clients drop out during the aggregation process. To
bound the leakage of a certain client’s training data from her
individual model update, several differentially private mech-
anisms were proposed. McMahan et al. [24] offered client-
level differential privacy for recurrent language models based
on the celebrated moments account scheme in [25]. Here,
the moments account allows the release of all intermediate
results during the training process, particularly the gradients
per iteration; keeps track of privacy loss in every iteration; and
provides a tighter compositive/cumulative privacy guarantee.
However, in the practical federated learning scenario, only
the model update after multiple iterations/epochs is revealed,
whereas all intermediate gradients are hidden. Specific to this
case, Feldman et al. [26] analyzed the detailed amplification
effect of hiding intermediate results on differential privacy. In
contrast to these defense mechanisms, Bagdasaryan et al. [27]
developed a model replacement attack launched by malicious
clients to backdoor the global model at the cloud server.
Melis et al. [1] exploited membership and property inference
attacks to uncover features of the clients’ training data from
model updates.
Second is to improve the communication efficiency, espe-
cially the expensive and limited up-link bandwidth for mobile
clients. To overcome this bottleneck, two types of solution
methods have been proposed in general. One is to reduce
the total number of communication rounds between the cloud
server and the clients. A pioneering work is the federated
averaging algorithm proposed by McMahan et al. [9]. Its key
principle is to let each client locally train the global model
for multiple epochs, and then upload the model update. Thus,
it is more communication efficient than the common practice
of conventional distributed learning to exchange gradients per
iteration in datacenter-based scenarios. The other complemen-
tary way is to further reduce the size of the transmitted
message in each communication round, particularly through
compressing model updates. Typical compression techniques
include sparsification, subsampling, and probabilistic quan-
tization coupled with random rotation. For example, after
quantization, the original float-type elements of the update
of the global model can be encoded as integer-type values
with a few bits [28], [29]. Considering the compressed model
updates are discrete, while classic differentially private deep
learning mechanisms, hinging on the Gaussian mechanism,
only support continuous inputs, Agarwal et al. [30] proposed
a Binomial mechanism to guarantee differential privacy for one
iteration while enjoying communication efficiency. Another
effective approach to improving communication efficiency is
to first apply dropout strategies to the global model, and then
let clients train over the same reduced model architecture [31].
As a result, the downloaded model and the uploaded model
update can be compressed in terms of dimension.
Third is from learning theory. The federated learning frame-
work has several atypical characteristics: non independent
and identically distributed (non-iid) and unbalanced data dis-
tributed over numerous clients with limited and unstable net-
work connections. Such statistical heterogeneity and existence
of stragglers make most existing analysis techniques for iid
data infeasible and pose significant challenges for designing
theoretically robust and efficient learning algorithms. The fed-
erated averaging algorithm mentioned above, as a cornerstone
of federated learning, empirically shows its effectiveness in
some tasks, but was observed to diverge for a large number
of local epochs in [9]. More specifically, it lets multiple
chosen clients run mini-batch Stochastic Gradient Descent
(SGD) in parallel, and then lets the cloud server periodically
aggregate the model updates in a weighted manner, where
weights are proportional to the sizes of the clients’ training
sets. Recently, Yu et al. [32] and Li et al. [33] advanced
the convergency analysis of federated averaging by imposing
smooth and bounded assumptions on the loss function. The
follow-up work [34] further presented a momentum extension
of parallel restarted SGD, which is compatible with federated
learning. Different from the above work, Smith et al. [35]
focused on learning separate but related personalized models
for distinct clients by leveraging multitask learning for shared
representation. Chen et al. [36] instead adopted meta-learning
to enable client-specific modeling, where clients contribute
information at the algorithm level rather than the model level
to help train the meta-learner. Mohri et al. [37] considered
an unfairness issue that the global model can be unevenly
biased toward different clients. They thus proposed a new
agnostic federated learning framework where the global model
can be optimized for any possible target distribution, which is
formed via a mixture of client distributions. Eichner et al. [38]
captured data heterogeneity in federated learning, particularly
cyclic patterns, and offered a pluralistic solution for convex
objectives and sequential SGD.
Fourth is regarding production and standardization. Google
has deployed federated learning in its Android keyboard,
called Gboard, to polish several language tasks, including next-
word prediction [2], query suggestion [39], out-of-vocabulary
words learning [11], and emoji prediction [12]. In particular,
the query suggestion used logistic regression as the trigger-
ing model for on-device training to determine whether the
candidate suggestion should be shown or not. In addition,
the other three tasks leveraged a tailored Long Short-Term
Memory (LSTM) Recurrent Neural Network (RNN), called
Coupled Input and Forget Gate (CIFG). In [40], Google’s
team also detailed their initial system design and summarized
practical deployment issues, such as irregular device availabil-
ity, unreliable network connectivity and interrupted execution,
orchestration of lock-step execution across heterogonous de-
vices, and limited device storage and computation resources.
They also pointed out some future optimization directions in
bias, convergence time, device scheduling, and bandwidth. To
facilitate open research, Google integrated a federated learning
simulation interface into its deep learning framework, called
TensorFlow Federated [41]. However, this open-source module
lacks several core functionalities, e.g., secure and privacy
preserving mechanisms, on-device training, socket commu-
TABLE I
FREQUENTLY USED NOTATIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS.
Notation Remark
Wm×d Global/Full model at the cloud server, denoted by a
matrix with m rows and d columns
S = {1, 2, . . . ,m} Full row index set of W
C, |C| = n The set of n clients chosen by the cloud server in one
communication round, the cardinality of C
Cˆ ⊂ C The up-to-date set of clients who are alive throughout
the communication round
i ∈ C A chosen client i
S(i) ⊂ S Client i’s real index set that corresponds to local data
and specifies truly required rows of W
S′′(i) A perturbed index set of client i, to download the
submodel from the cloud server and to securely upload
the update of the submodel to the cloud server
WS′′(i) Client i’s downloaded submodel
WS(i) ⋂S′′(i) Client i’s succinct submodel for local training
∆WS(i) ⋂S′′(i) Client i’s succinct submodel update
∆WS′′(i) Client i’s uploaded submodel update by padding zero
vectors to the succinct submodel update
 A privacy level/budget of local differential privacy
b, β, h, φ A Bloom filter with β bits and h hash functions,
representing/accommodating a set of φ elements
l Dimension of vector in the secure aggregation protocol
p
(i)
1 , p
(i)
2 , p
(i)
3 , p
(i)
4 Client i’s probability parameters to generate S′′(i)
p
(i)
5 = p
(i)
1 (p
(i)
3 − p(i)4 ) + p(i)4 The probability that an index in client i’s real index
set will fall into her perturbed index set
p
(i)
6 = p
(i)
2 (p
(i)
3 − p(i)4 ) + p(i)4 The probability that an index not in client i’s real index
set will fall into her perturbed index set
p7 The probability of the cloud server ascertaining that
an index belongs to some client’s real index set and
also learning her detailed update with respect to this
index from the securely aggregated submodel update
p8 The probability of the cloud server ascertaining that
an index does not belong to some client’s real index
set from the securely aggregated submodel update
s The expected cardinality of each client’s real index set
ZR = {0, 1, . . . , R− 1} The least residue system modulo R
γ A level of stochastic quantization mechanism
FL Conventional federated learning
SFL Secure federated learning, namely conventional feder-
ated learning with secure aggregation
SFSL Secure federated submodel learning
CPP Choice of probability parameters
SA Secure aggregation
nication between cloud server and clients, task scheduling,
and dropout/exception handling. These significantly suppress
federated learning related productions in other commercial
companies. Caldas et al. [42] released a benchmark for feder-
ated learning, called LEAF. Currently, LEAF comprises some
representative datasets, evaluation metrics, and a referenced
implementation of federated averaging.
Parallel to existing work, where clients use the same (simpli-
fied) global model for learning, we propose a novel federated
submodel learning framework for the sake of scalability. Under
this framework, we identify and remedy new security and
privacy issues, due to the dependence between the position
of a client’s desired submodel and her private data as well as
the misalignment of clients’ submodel updates in aggregation.
III. PRELIMINARIES
In this section, we elaborate on the privacy risks sketched
in Section I-C and formally define the corresponding security
requirements. We also review some existing building blocks.
We first introduce some necessary notations. For the sake of
clarity, frequently used notations and abbreviations throughout
this paper are also listed in Table I. We use a two-dimensional
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Fig. 2. Federated submodel learning with secure aggregation can still leak a concrete client’s real indices and her detailed updates to the cloud server, compared
with conventional federated learning with secure aggregation. The rounded rectangle colored in dark gray denotes the process of secure aggregation [18],
where the cloud server, as the aggregator, only obtains the sum of vectors from multiple clients but does not know any individual client’s vector. Additionally,
the row in a table with dashed lines indicates that the client does not download, train over, or upload this row.
matrix with m rows and d columns to represent the global/full
model, denoted as W. Such a matrix-based representation not
only suffices for the recommendation models used in Alibaba
but also can easily degenerate to a widely used vector-based
representation [18], [30], by setting the number of columns
d to 1. Additionally, we let S = {1, 2, . . . ,m} denote the
entire row index set of W. Moreover, we let C denote those
clients who are selected by the cloud server to participate in
one communication round of federated submodel learning. For
a chosen client i ∈ C, we let S(i) ⊂ S denote her real index
set, which implies that the user data of client i involves the
rows in W with indices S(i).
A. Details on Privacy Risks and Security Requirements
We now expand on two kinds of privacy leakages that the
federated submodel learning brings in, compared with conven-
tional federated learning. We provide Fig. 2 for illustration. We
here adopt an honest-but-curious security model, in which the
cloud server and all clients follow the designed protocol, but
try to glean sensitive information about others.
The first kind of privacy leakage is the disclosure of a
client’s real index set, which specifies the position of a sub-
model and implies the client’s private data, to the cloud server.
For example, each row of the embedding matrix for goods in
the recommendation model is linked with a certain goods ID,
which indicates that a client’s real index set, specifying her
required rows of the embedding matrix, is in fact the goods
IDs in her private data. Similarly, when federated submodel
learning is applied to the natural language scenario (e.g., next-
word prediction in Gboard), a client’s real index set to locate
her wanted parameters of word embedding is actually the
vocabulary extracted from her typed texts. Thus, the disclosure
of a client’s real index set to the cloud server is still regarded
as the leakage of the client’s private data. In contrast, for
conventional federated learning, each client essentially uses
the full index set, which is public to the cloud server and all
other clients, and does not reveal any private information.
The second kind of privacy leakage is from the aggregation
of misaligned submodel updates, where the cloud server may
not only know that a certain client has a concrete index
but also learn her detailed update with respect to this index.
In addition to the fact that the real index reveals a client’s
private data, the client’s individual submodel update can still
memorize or even allow reconstruction of her private data,
namely “model inversion” attack [1], [43]–[46]. To conceal a
client’s individual update in conventional federated learning,
the secure aggregation protocol [18] can be applied, which
allows the cloud server to obtain the sum of multiple vectors
without learning any individual vector. As shown in Fig. 2(a),
with respect to index 2, Alice submits the update, denoted by
the vector (4, 5, 2, 9), whereas Bob and Charlie submit two
zero vectors. The secure aggregation protocol can guarantee
that the cloud server only obtains the sum of three vectors, i.e.,
(4, 5, 2, 9), but does not know the content of any individual
vector. This further implies that from the aggregate result, the
cloud server can merely infer that at least one client has index
2, but cannot identify which client(s). Such a functionality
is essentially analogous to anonymization. In a nutshell, the
zero updates from Bob and Charlie function as two shields
of Alice. However, in federated submodel learning, due to
the differentiation and misalignment of clients’ submodels, the
“zero” shields from other clients vanish, and the aggregation
of updates with respect to a certain index can come from
one unique client, making secure aggregation ineffective. For
example, in Fig. 2(b), only Alice who has index 2 submits the
update (4, 5, 2, 9), whereas Bob and Charlie submit nothing.
Without the blindings from Bob and Charlie, the cloud server
not only knows that Alice has index 2 while Bob and Charlie
do not have but also learns Alice’s detailed update (4, 5, 2, 9).
Given the two kinds of privacy leakages above, we define
the corresponding security requirements. First, for the disclo-
sure of real index sets when clients interact with the cloud
server, we consider that each client should have plausible
deniability of whether a certain index is or is not in her real
index set. To measure the strength of plausible deniability, we
adopt local differential privacy, which is a variant of standard
differential privacy in the local setting. Specifically, the per-
turbation in local differential privacy is performed by clients
in a distributed manner, rather than relying on a data curator,
as a trusted authority to conduct centralized perturbation in
differential privacy. Thus, the privacy of an individual client’s
data is not only preserved from external attackers but also from
the untrusted data curator, e.g., the cloud server in our context.
Due to its intriguing security properties, local differential
privacy for various population statistics has recently received
significant industrial deployments (e.g., in Google [47], [48],
Apple [49], and Microsoft [50]), as well as lasting academic
attention [51]–[61]. We now present the formal definition of
local differential privacy as follows:
Definition 1 (Local Differential Privacy). A randomized mech-
anism M satisfies -local differential privacy, if for any pair of
inputs from a client, denoted as x and y, and for any possible
output of M , denoted as z, we have
Pr (M (x) = z)
Pr (M (y) = z)
≤ exp () ,
where  is a privacy budget controlled by the client. A smaller
 offers a better privacy guarantee.
Intuitively, the above definition says that the output distribution
of the randomized mechanism does not change too much,
given distinct inputs from the client. Thus, local differential
privacy formalizes a sort of plausible deniability: no matter
what output is revealed, it is approximately equally as likely to
have come from one input as any other input. In addition, when
local differential privacy applies to obscure the membership
of a certain index in federated submodel learning, the inputs
and the outputs are boolean values, where possible inputs
(resp., outputs) are two states: a certain index “in” or “not
in” a client’s real (resp., revealed) index set. Moreover, we
can check that conventional federated learning provides the
strongest deniability, where the level of local differential
privacy is  = ln(1/1) = 0 for each client. The reason is
that no matter whether an index is or is not in a client’s
real index set (different inputs), this index will definitely be
revealed (the same output). In contrast, federated submodel
learning provides the weakest deniability, where the level of
local differential privacy is  = ln(1/0) =∞ for each client,
because if an index is in (resp., not in) a client’s real index set
(different inputs), this index will definitely (resp., definitely
not) be revealed, i.e., the output with probability 1 (resp., 0).
Second, direct secure aggregation of submodel updates is
the most efficient but insecure case, which can leak whether
some client has a certain index as well as her detailed update.
In contrast, the other extreme case is conventional federated
learning with secure aggregation, which is most secure but
inefficient. Specifically, all participating clients upload the full
model updates, which can perfectly prevent privacy leakages
due to the misalignment of customized submodels. To enable
clients to tune privacy and efficiency in a fine-grained manner,
we define a client-controllable privacy protection mechanism
for submodel updates aggregation.
Definition 2. A privacy protection mechanism for submodel
updates aggregation is client controllable, if it enables partic-
ipating clients to determine the probabilities of the following
two complementary events: From the securely aggregated
submodel update,
• Event 1: the cloud server ascertains that an index belongs
to some client’s real index set and also learns her detailed
update with respect to this index;
• Event 2: the cloud server ascertains that an index does
not belong to some client’s real index set.
We note that revealing the states of some clients having and
not having a certain index should both be regarded as privacy
leakages. Furthermore, when the above definition applies to
federated learning, and if at least two clients participate in
aggregation, the probability of Event 1 is 0, and the probability
of Event 2 is still 0 for those indices within the union of the
chosen clients’ real index sets. For an index outside the union,
e.g., index 5 shown in Fig. 2(a), the probability of Event 2 is
approaching 1. The reason is that from the aggregate zero
vector, the cloud server almost ascertains that all clients do
not have this index, despite of some rare cases (e.g., Alice
and Bob submit two vectors of elements differing in signs,
and Charlie submits a zero vector).
B. Building Blocks
We review randomized response, secure aggregation, and
Bloom filter underlying our design.
1) Randomized Response: Randomized response, due to
Warner in 1965 [62], is a survey technique in the social
sciences to collect statistical information about illegal, em-
barrassing, or sensitive topics, where the respondents want
to preserve privacies of their answers. A classical example
for illustrating this technique is the “Are you a member
of the communist party?” question. For this question, each
respondent flips a fair coin in secret and tells the truth if
it comes up tails; otherwise, she flips a second coin and
responds “Yes” if heads and “No” if tails. Thus, a communist
(resp., non-communist) will answer “Yes” with probability
75% (resp., 25%) and “No” with probability 25% (resp., 75%).
The intuition behind randomized response is that it provides
plausible deniability for both “Yes” and “No” answers. In
particular, a communist can contribute her response of “Yes”
to the event that the first and second coin flips were both
heads, which occurs with probability 25%. Meanwhile, a non-
communist can also contribute her response of “No” to the
event that the first coin is heads and the second coin is tails,
which still occurs with probability 25%. Furthermore, the
plausible deniability of randomized response can be rigorously
quantified by local differential privacy. As analyzed in [47],
[63], for a one-time response, each respondent has local
differential privacy at the level  = ln(75%/25%) = ln 3,
irrespective of any attacker’s prior knowledge.
2) Secure Aggregation: An individual model update may
leak a client’s private data under the notorious model in-
version attack. Nevertheless, to update the global model in
federated learning, the cloud server does not need to access
any individual model update and only requires the aggregate,
basically the sum, of multiple model updates. For example, if
n clients participate in the aggregation, denoted as C, where
client i ∈ C holds a vector ∆w(i) ∈ Zl of dimension l, the
cloud server should just obtain the sum
∑
i∈C ∆w
(i), while
maintaining each individual ∆w(i) in secret. For this purpose
and the characteristics of mobile devices, particularly limited
and unstable network connections and common dropouts,
Google researchers proposed a secure aggregation protocol
in [18]. Implied by the functionality of oblivious addition,
secure aggregation in federated learning can further ensure
that even if the model inversion attack succeeds, the attacker
(e.g., the honest-but-curious or active adversary cloud server,
or an external intruder) may only infer that a group of clients
has a certain data item but cannot identify which concrete
client. This functionality is similar to anonymization. In what
follows, we briefly review the secure aggregation protocol
from communication settings, technical intuitions, scalability,
and efficiency.
First, we introduce its communication settings. During the
aggregation process, a client can neither establish direct com-
munication channels with other clients nor natively authenti-
cate other clients. However, each client has a secure (private
and authenticated) channel with the cloud server. Thus, if one
client intends to exchange messages with other clients, she
needs to hinge on the cloud server as a relay. In addition,
to guarantee confidentiality and integrity against the mediate
cloud server, client-to-client messages should be encrypted
with symmetric authenticated encryption, where the secret
key is set up through Diffie-Hellman key exchange between
two clients. Moreover, to defend active adversaries, a digital
signature scheme is required for consistency checks. These
basic settings make the secure aggregation protocol different
from other relevant work about oblivious addition [19]–[21],
or, more generally, secure multiparty computation [64]–[67],
which requires direct peer-to-peer communication between
clients; assumes the availability of multiple noncolluding cloud
servers; or resorts to a trusted third party for key generation
and distribution.
Second, we outline the technical intuitions behind secure ag-
gregation. Each client doubly masks her private data, including
a self mask and a mutual mask. Here, the self mask is chosen
by the client, whereas the mutual mask is agreed on with
the other clients through Diffie-Hellman key exchange and is
additively cancelable when summed with others. Considering
that some clients may drop out at any point, their masks
cannot be canceled. To handle this problem, each client uses
a threshold secret sharing scheme to split her private seed of
a Pseudo-Random Number Generator (PRNG) for generating
the self mask as well as her private key for generating the
mutual mask, and then distribute the shares to the other clients.
As long as some minimum (no less than the threshold) number
of clients remain alive, they can jointly help the cloud server
remove the self masks of live clients and the mutual masks
between dropped and live clients.
Third, we present the scalability and efficiency of the secure
aggregation protocol. We list its communication, computation,
TABLE II
COMPLEXITIES OF THE SECURE AGGREGATION PROTOCOL IN THE
HONEST-BUT-CURIOUS SETTING.
Communication Computation Storage
Client O(n+ l) O(n2 + nl) O(n+ l)
Server O(n2 + nl) O(n2l) O(n2 + l)
and storage complexities in Table II, where n is the number of
clients involved in the aggregation, and l denotes the number
of data items held by each client or the dimension of her
data vector. We can see that this protocol is quite efficient
for large-scale data vectors, especially from communication
overhead, and thus can apply to mobile applications. In
particular, as reported in [18], when 214 clients are involved
in the aggregation, and each client has 224 16-bit values, the
communication overhead of the secure aggregation protocol
expands 1.98× over sending data in the clear.
3) Bloom Filter: Bloom filter, conceived by Bloom in
1970 [68], is a space-efficient probabilistic data structure to
represent a set whose elements come from a huge domain.
In addition, when testing whether an element is a member
of the set, a false positive is possible, but a false negative is
impossible. In other words, an element that is diagnosed to be
present in the set possibly does not belong to the set in reality,
and an element that is judged to be not present definitively
does not belong to the set. We describe its technical details
and properties as follows.
A Bloom filter is a β-length bit vector initially set to 0,
denoted as b. In addition, it requires h different independent
hash functions. The output range of these hash functions is
{1, 2, . . . , β}, which corresponds to the β positions of the
Bloom filter. To represent a set of φ elements, we apply h
hash functions to each element and set the Bloom filter at the
positions of h hash values to 1. In the membership test phase,
to check whether an element belongs to the set, we simply
check the Bloom filter at the positions of its h hash values. If
any of the bits at these positions is 0, the element is definitely
not in the set. If all are 1, then either the element is in the set,
or the bits have by chance been set to 1 during the insertion
of other elements, resulting in a false positive. Specifically,
the false positive rate (FPR) of a Bloom filter depends on the
length of Bloom filter β; the number of hash functions h; and
the cardinality of set φ. According to [69], [70], its detailed
formula is given as
FPR =
(
1−
(
1− 1
β
)hφ)h
≈
(
1− exp
(
−hφ
β
))h
.
Given β and φ, to minimize the false positive rate, the optimal
number of hash functions is
h = ln 2
β
φ
.
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Fig. 3. An illustration of the design rationale of secure federated submodel learning.
In addition, given φ and assuming the optimal number of hash
functions h is used, to achieve a desired false positive rate
FPR, the optimal length of Bloom filter should be
β = −φ ln FPR
(ln 2)
2 . (1)
Thus, the optimal number of bits per the set’s element is
β
φ
= − ln FPR
(ln 2)
2 ,
and the corresponding number of hash functions is
h = − ln FPR
ln 2
.
The above deductions mean that for a given false positive rate,
the length of a Bloom filter is proportional to the size of the
set being filtered, while the required number of hash functions
only relies on the target false positive rate.
We further introduce an appealing property of Bloom filter
when performing union over the underlying sets. To represent
sets, denoted as ∀i ∈ C,S(i), we use Bloom filters with
the same length and the same hash functions, denoted as
∀i ∈ C,b(i). Then, the union of these sets, i.e., ⋃i∈C S(i),
can be represented by a Bloom filter, which performs bitwise
OR operations over the Bloom filters, i.e.,
∨
i∈C b
(i). Such a
union operation is lossless (implying that the false positive rate
remains unchanged) in the sense that the resulting Bloom filter
is the same as the Bloom filter created from scratch using the
union of these sets. In addition, because the Bloom filter needs
to accommodate the union of sets, the parameter φ, denoting
the cardinality of the set, should be determined by estimating
the cardinality of the union
⋃
i∈C S(i) rather than that of each
individual set S(i).
We finally present a generalized version of Bloom filter,
called counting Bloom filter [71]. It consists of β coun-
ters/integers rather than β bits and can represent a multiset,
where an element can occur more than once. The main
difference between counting Bloom filter and Bloom filter
lies in that when representing an element, we increment the
counters by one at the positions of its h hash values. Thus,
compared with the membership test in Bloom filter, counting
Bloom filter further supports more general counting queries
of a given element, i.e., whether the count number of a given
element in a multiset is smaller than a certain threshold.
IV. DESIGN OF SECURE FEDERATED SUBMODEL
LEARNING
In this section, we present the design rationale and the
design details of Secure Federated Submodel Learning (SFSL).
A. Design Rationale
We illustrate our key design principles mainly through
demonstrating how to handle two fundamental problems raised
in Section I-D and how to resolve several practical issues.
As shown in Fig. 3, we handle two fundamental problems
in a unified manner rather than in separate ways. During
both download and upload phases, a client consistently uses
a perturbed index set in place of her real index set. In
contrast, during the local training phase, the client leverages
the intersection of her real index set and perturbed index set to
prepare the succinct submodel and involved user data. With the
blinding of the perturbed index set to interact with the outside
world, the client holds a plausible deniability of some index
being in or not in her real index set. Specifically, the client
generates her perturbed index set locally with randomized
response as follows. First, the sensitive question asked by the
cloud server here is “Do you have a certain index?”. Then,
the client answers “Yes” with two customized probabilities,
conditioned on whether the index is or is not in her real
index set. These two probabilities allow the client to fine-tune
balance between privacy and utility.
We further carefully examine the feasibility of our index set
perturbation method in handling two fundamental problems.
For the first problem in the download phase, if a client intends
to download a certain row of the full matrix, and she actually
downloads, she can blame her action to randomization, i.e.,
the occurrence of the event that the index not in a client’s
real index set returns a “Yes” answer. Similarly, if a client
does not intend to download the row, and she actually does
not, she can still attribute her action to randomization, i.e.,
the occurrence of the event that the index in a client’s real
index returns a “No” answer. Regarding the second problem
in the upload phase, the usage of the perturbed index set
still empowers a client to deny her underlying intention of
modifying or not modifying some row of the full matrix, even
if the cloud server observes her binary action of modifying or
not modifying. Additionally, for a concrete row, there are two
different groups of clients involved in the joint modification:
(1) One group consists of those clients who intend to modify
the row and contribute nonzero modifications; and (2) the
other group comprises those clients who do not intend to
modify the row and pretend to modify by submitting zero
modifications. Under the secure aggregation guarantee, even
though the cloud server observes the aggregate modification,
it is hard for the cloud server, as an adversary, to identify
any individual modification and further to infer whether some
client originally intends to perform a modification or not. The
hardness is controlled by the sizes of two groups, alternatively
the probabilities of an index in and not in the real index set
returning a “Yes” answer, which are fully tunable by clients.
In addition to these two basic problems, there still exist
two practical issues to be solved before the above index set
perturbation method can apply to federated submodel learning.
The first issue regards practical efficiency, i.e., whether it is
practical and necessary for the cloud server to ask “Do you
have a certain index?” for each index in the full index set. In
our context, the number of rows of the matrix, representing the
deep learning model, is in the magnitude of billions. Thus, it
is impractical for a client to answer billion-scale questions and
further download and securely upload those rows with “Yes”
answers of the full model. We thus turn to narrowing down the
size of the questions and identify a sufficient and necessary
index set, namely the union of the chosen clients’ real index
sets. Our optimization is inspired by an example: if a client’s
real index set is of size 100, and the full index set is of size
1 billion, using the probability parameters in the survey of
party membership, her expected number of “Yes” answers is
102×75%+(109−102)×25% ≈ 2.5×108. Such a calculation
implies that the dominant “Yes” answers are those with “No”
in reality but “Yes” due to randomness. Nevertheless, most
of the “No”-to-“Yes” answers are useless. More specifically,
for those indices that do not belong to any client’s real index
set, e.g., index 5 in Fig. 2 and Fig. 3, although part (25% in
expectation) of clients upload zero vectors for randomization,
the cloud server can still infer from the aggregate zero vectors
that these clients do not actually have the indices. Thus, it is
not necessary to cover any index outside the union.
Accompanied with the first issue, another fundamental and
thorny problem that arises is how multiple clients can obtain
the union of their real index sets under the mediation of an
untrusted cloud server without revealing any individual client’s
real index set to others, i.e., the need of a private set union
protocol. Considering any existing scheme doest not satisfy
the atypical setting and the stringent requirement of federated
submodel learning, we design a novel private set union scheme
based on Bloom filter, secure aggregation, and randomization.
We first let each chosen client represent her real index set as
a Bloom filter. Then, different from the common practice to
derive the union of sets by performing bit-wise OR operations
over their Bloom filters, which naturally requires both addition
and multiplication operations, we let the cloud server directly
“sum” the Bloom filters. Here, the sum operation can be
performed obliviously and efficiently under the coordination of
an untrusted cloud server with the secure aggregation protocol.
The aggregate Bloom filter is actually a counting Bloom filter,
equivalent to constructing it from scratch by inserting each
set in sequence. Besides the membership information, the
counting Bloom filter still contains the count number of each
element in the union. To prevent such an undesirable leakage,
we let each client replace bit 1s in her Bloom filter with
random integers, while keeping each bit 0 unchanged. When
recovering the union of real index sets, one naive method for
the cloud server is to do membership tests for the full index set,
which is prohibitively time consuming, and can also introduce
a large number of false positives. To handle these problems,
we let the cloud server first divide the full index set into a
certain number of partitions, and then let each client fill in
a bit vector to indicate whether there exists an element of
her real index set falling into these partitions. Then, just like
computing the union with Bloom filters, the cloud server can
securely determine those partitions that contain clients’ real
indices to further facilitate efficient union reconstruction.
The second issue regards the longitudinal privacy guarantee
when a client is chosen to participate in multiple commu-
nication rounds. However, the initial version of randomized
response only provides a rigorous privacy guarantee when an
audience answers the same question once, facilitating only
a one-time response to “Do you have a certain index?” in
our context. Thus, we need to extend the original randomized
response mechanism to allow repeated responses from the
same client to those already answered indices in a privacy-
preserving manner. Our extension leverages key principles
from Randomized Aggregatable Privacy-Preserving Ordinal
Response (RAPPOR) [47], [48] and plays the randomized
response game twice with a memoization step between. Specif-
ically, the noisy answers generated by the inner randomized
response will be memoized and permanently replace real
answers in the outer randomized response. This ensures that
even though a client responds to the membership of a concrete
index for an infinite number of times, she can still hold a
plausible deniability of her real answer, where the level of
deniability is lower bounded by the memoized noisy answer.
B. Design Details
Following the guidelines in Section IV-A, we propose a
secure scheme for federated submodel learning. We introduce
the scheme in a top-down manner, where we first give an
overview of its top-level architecture and then show two
underlying modules, namely index set perturbation and private
set union. For the sake of clarity, we outline our design in
Algorithm 1, Algorithm 2, and Algorithm 3.
1) Secure Federated Submodel Learning: Before presenting
our secure federated submodel learning framework, we first
briefly review the federated averaging algorithm [9], which is
the cornerstone and core of conventional federated learning.
Algorithm 1: Secure Federated Submodel Learning
/* Cloud server’s process */
1 Initializes the global model W;
2 foreach communication round do
3 Randomly selects n clients, denoted as C, where |C| = n;
4 Launches private set union (Algorithm 3), gets the union of
n clients’ real index sets, namely
⋃
i∈C S(i), and delivers
the union result to the up-to-date set of clients who are
alive, denoted as Cˆ ⊂ C;
5 foreach Client i ∈ Cˆ do
6 Receives and stores the perturbed index set S ′′(i) from
client i, and returns the submodel WS′′(i) and
training hyperparameters to i;
// Securely aggregates weighted submodel
updates and count vectors
7 foreach j ∈ ⋃i∈C S(i) do
8 Determines the live clients involving index j, denoted
as Cˆj = {i|i ∈ Cˆ ∧ j ∈ S ′′(i)}, lets them submit
materials for secure aggregation, and obtains the sum
of (weighted) updates
∑
i∈Cˆj ∆w
(i)
j and the total
count number of relevant samples
∑
i∈Cˆj v
(i)
j ;
9 Updates the j-th row of the global model W by
adding
∑
i∈Cˆj ∆w
(i)
j
/∑
i∈Cˆj v
(i)
j ;
/* Client i’s process */
10 Determines her real index set S(i) based on local data;
11 Participates in private set union (Algorithm 3);
12 Generates a perturbed index set S ′′(i) (Algorithm 2);
13 Uses S ′′(i) to download a submodel, denoted as WS′′(i) ;
14 Depending on the succinct index set S ′′(i)⋂S(i), locally
extracts the succinct submodel WS′′(i) ⋂S(i) from WS′′(i)
and prepares involved data as the succinct training set;
15 Locally trains WS′′(i) ⋂S(i) using the hyperparameters and
obtains the update of succinct submodel ∆WS′′(i) ⋂S(i) ;
16 Initializes the submodel update to be uploaded, denoted as
∆WS′′(i) , all to 0, and then adds ∆WS′′(i) ⋂S(i) ;
17 Counts the number of samples involving each index j ∈ S ′′(i)
and stores the results to the vector vS′′(i) ;
18 Updates ∆WS′′(i) by multiplying each row with the
corresponding count number in vS′′(i) ;
19 Uploads materials for securely aggregating ∆WS′′(i) ,vS′′(i) .
In particular, federated averaging is a synchronous distributed
learning method, for non-iid and unbalanced training data dis-
tributed at massive communication-constrained clients, under
the coordination of a cloud server. At the beginning of one
communication round, the cloud server sends the up-to-date
parameters of the global model and the training hyperpa-
rameters to some clients. Here, the training hyperparameters
include the optimization algorithm, typically mini-batch SGD,
the local batch size (the number of training samples used to
locally update the global model once, namely per iteration),
the local epochs (the number of passes over a client’s entire
training data), and the learning rate. Then, each chosen client
trains the global model on her data and uploads the update of
the global model together with the size of her training data to
the cloud server. The cloud server takes a weighted average
of all updates, where one client’s weight is proportional to the
size of her local data, and finally adds the aggregate update
to the global model.
We now present secure federated submodel learning in
Algorithm 1, which generalizes the federated averaging al-
gorithm to support effective and efficient submodel learning
and preserves desirable security and privacy properties while
incorporating the unstable and limited network connections of
mobile devices. At the initial stage, the cloud server randomly
initializes the global model (Line 1). For each communication
round, the cloud server first selects some clients to participate
(Line 3) and also maintains an up-to-date set of clients who are
alive throughout the whole round. A chosen client determines
her real index set based on her local data, which can specify
the “position” of her truly required submodel (Line 10). For
example, if the visited goods IDs of a Taobao user include
{1, 2, 4}, then she requires the first, second, and fourth rows
of the embedding matrix for goods IDs, which further implies
that her real index set should contain {1, 2, 4}. Then, the cloud
server launches the private set union protocol to obtain the
union of all chosen clients’ real index sets while keeping
each individual client’s real index set in secret (Lines 4 and
11). The union result will be further delivered to live clients,
based on which each client can perturb her real index set
with a customized local differential privacy guarantee (Line
12). In addition, each client will use the perturbed index set,
rather than the real index set, to download her submodel
and upload the submodel update (Lines 13 and 19). In other
words, when interacting with the cloud server, a client’s real
index set is replaced with her perturbed index set, which
provides deniability of her real index set and thus obscures
her training data. Upon receiving the perturbed index set from
a client, the cloud server stores it for later usage and returns
the corresponding submodel and the training hyperparameters
to the client (Line 6). Depending on the intersection of the
real index set and the perturbed index set, called the succinct
index set, the client extracts a succinct submodel and prepares
involved data as the succinct training set (Line 14). For
example, if a Taobao user’s real index set is {1, 2, 4} and
her perturbed index set is {2, 4, 6, 9}, she receives a submodel
with row indices {2, 4, 6, 9} from the cloud server, but just
needs to train the succinct submodel with row indices {2, 4}
over her local data involving goods IDs {2, 4}. After training
under the preset hyperparameters, the client derives the update
of the succinct submodel (Line 15) and further prepares the
submodel update to be uploaded with the perturbed index
set by adding the update of the succinct submodel to the
rows with the succinct indices and padding zero vectors to
the other rows (Line 16). Additionally, to facilitate the cloud
server in averaging submodel updates according to the sizes of
relevant local training data, each client also needs to count the
number of her samples involving every index in the perturbed
index set (Line 17). In particular, the numbers of samples
involving the indices outside the succinct index set are all
zeros. Furthermore, each client prepares the submodel update
to be uploaded by multiplying each row with the correspond-
ing count number, namely the weight, in advance (Line 18).
Algorithm 2: Client i’s Index Set Perturbation
Input: Client i’s real index set S(i), Union of the chosen
clients’ real index sets
⋃
i∈C S(i), Client i’s memoized
index set Y(i) (resp., N (i)) initialized to ∅ at very
beginning with “Yes” (resp., “No”) permanent answers
to the question “Do you have a certain index?”, Client
i’s customized probability parameters
0 ≤ p(i)1 , p(i)2 , p(i)3 , p(i)4 ≤ 1.
Output: Client i’s doubly perturbed index set S ′′(i)
1 S ′(i) = ∅,S ′′(i) = ∅;
// Permanent randomized response
2 foreach j ∈ ⋃i∈C S(i)∧ j /∈ Y(i)⋃N (i) do
3 if j ∈ S(i) then
4 Adds j to S ′(i) with probability p(i)1 ;
5 else
6 Adds j to S ′(i) with probability p(i)2 ;
// Memoization of permanent responses
7 if j ∈ S ′(i) then
8 Y(i) = Y(i)⋃ j;
9 else
10 N (i) = N (i)⋃ j;
// Instantaneous randomized response
11 foreach j ∈ ⋃i∈C S(i) do
12 if j ∈ Y(i) then
13 Adds j to S ′′(i) with probability p(i)3 ;
14 else
15 Adds j to S ′′(i) with probability p(i)4 ;
16 return S ′′(i)
Finally, the weighted submodel updates and the count vectors
from live clients are securely aggregated under the guidance
of the cloud server (Lines 7–9 and 19). Specifically, the cloud
server guides the secure aggregation by enumerating every
index in the union of the chosen clients’ real index sets.
For each index, the cloud server first determines the set of
live clients whose perturbed index sets contain this index
and then lets these clients submit the materials for securely
adding up the weighted updates and the count numbers with
respect to this index (Line 8). The cloud server finally applies
the update to the global model in this row by adding the
quotient of the sum of the weighted updates and the total count
number, namely the weighted average (Line 9). Considering
that the weighted submodel updates and the count numbers are
aggregated side by side, each client can augment the matrix,
denoting her weighted submodel update, with the transposed
count vector in the last column, when preparing materials
for secure aggregation (Line 19). In addition, to reduce the
interactions between the cloud server and a client, they can
package all the materials supporting secure aggregation, rather
than exchange the materials for one index each time (Lines 7–
9), i.e., the cloud server executes Lines 7 and 8 for each live
client i ∈ Cˆ in parallel and then executes Line 9 for each index
in the union j ∈ ⋃i∈C S(i).
2) Index Set Perturbation: We now present how a client can
generate a perturbed index set to download her submodel and
to upload the update of the submodel, with a customized local
differential privacy guarantee against the cloud server. Just like
the exemplary question about party membership, the sensitive
question here is “Do you have a certain index?”, asked by
the cloud server. The clients participating in one round of
federated submodel learning make up the population to be
surveyed. Thus, the clients can use randomized response to an-
swer “Yes” or “No”, which provides measurable deniabilities
of their true answers. However, as sketched in Section IV-A,
several practical issues need to be resolved so that randomized
response can truly apply here. In what follows, we elaborate
on our solution details on these issues.
As shown in Algorithm 2, we view the union of the chosen
clients’ real index sets, rather than the full index set, as the
scope of the cloud server’s questionnaire (Input). We reason
about necessity and sufficiency as follows. Without loss of
generality, we consider client i and the other chosen clients
C\{i}. If any client in C\{i} wants to obtain deniability of
her real indices, she requires client i to join as an audience to
answer the questions about her real indices, which implies that
client i should know the union of the other chosen clients’ real
index sets. By incorporating client i’s own real index set, the
questionnaire to client i should contain the union of all chosen
clients’ real index sets. We further apply the above reasoning to
all clients ∀i ∈ C and can derive that the global questionnaire
should contain the union of all chosen clients’ real index sets.
Next, we illustrate whether the union suffices. We consider
any index outside the union. Under the conventional federated
learning framework, each client will upload a zero vector to
the cloud server for this index. When the cloud server learns
that the sum is a zero vector, she can infer that all chosen
clients do not have this index. Please see index 5 in Fig. 2(a)
for an intuition. From this perspective, any index outside the
union does not need to be preserved in federated submodel
learning as well. Nevertheless, suppose an index outside the
union is introduced by chance, e.g., due to a false positive of
Bloom filter when reconstructing union in Algorithm 3. A nice
phenomenon occurs. On one hand, the privacy of federated
submodel learning can be enhanced in the sense that the cloud
server can only ascertain that those clients who return “Yes”
answers do not really have this index, but cannot ascertain
the states of the other clients due to plausible deniability.
On the other hand, those clients with “Yes” answers need
to download the row with respect to this index and further
to upload zero vectors through secure aggregation, which are
useless and increase their overheads.
Given the questionnaire, client i basically uses two prob-
ability parameters p(i)1 , p
(i)
2 in randomized response to fine-
tune the tension among effectiveness, efficiency, and privacy
(Lines 3–6). In particular, p(i)1 denotes the probability that an
index in client i’s real index set will return a “Yes” answer
and controls the factual size of a client’s user data contributed
to federated submodel learning. Thus, a larger p(i)1 implies
better effectiveness in terms of convergency rate. In addition,
p
(i)
2 denotes the probability that an index outside client i’s
real index set will return a “Yes” answer and determines the
number of redundant rows to be downloaded and the number
of padded zero vectors to be uploaded through the secure
aggregation protocol. Hence, given a fixed p(i)1 , a smaller p
(i)
2
indicates higher efficiency. Furthermore, p(i)1 , p
(i)
2 jointly adjust
the level of local differential privacy, where a pair of closer
p
(i)
1 , p
(i)
2 provides a better privacy guarantee. We examine three
typical examples: (1) The randomized response in the party
membership survey takes p(i)1 = 75% and p
(i)
2 = 25% for each
respondent; (2) conventional federated learning essentially
leverages the full index, takes p(i)1 = 1 and p
(i)
2 = 1 for each
client, and offers the best privacy and effectiveness guarantees
but the worst efficiency guarantee; and (3) federated submodel
learning adopts p(i)1 = 1 and p
(i)
2 = 0 for each client and
provides the best effectiveness and efficiency guarantees but
the worst privacy guarantee.
Considering that client i can be chosen to participate in mul-
tiple communication rounds and needs to repeatedly respond
to some answered indices, we extend the basic randomized
response mechanism to offer a rigorous privacy guarantee, also
called longitudinal privacy in the literature [47], [48], [59].
We adopt a memoization technique from RAPPOR. The core
idea of RAPPOR is to play the randomized response game
twice with a memoization step between. The first perturba-
tion step, called permanent randomized response, is used to
create a noisy answer, which is memoized by the client and
permanently reused in place of the real answer. The second
perturbation step, called instantaneous randomized response,
reports on the memoized answer over time, eventually com-
pletely revealing it. In other words, the privacy level, guar-
anteed by the underlying memoized answer in the permanent
randomized response, imposes a lower bound on the privacy
level, ensured by each instantaneous/revealed response. When
the memoization technique is applied to federated submodel
learning, we let client i maintain two index sets with “Yes”
and “No” answers in the permanent randomized response,
respectively (Input). Here, the permanent randomized response
mechanism is parameterized by two probabilities p(i)1 , p
(i)
2
to tune privacy and utility (Lines 3–6), as illustrated in the
preceding paragraph. In addition, given that one client can
be grouped with distinct clients in different communication
rounds while the union of real index sets varies from one
round to another, the client needs to handle new indices. As
a new index comes (Line 2), client i generates a permanent
noisy answer for it and further updates her two memoized sets
(Lines 7–10). Moreover, client i obtains her final perturbed
index set by performing an instantaneous randomized response
over the memoized answers to the union of real index sets in
the current communication round (Lines 11–16). In particular,
the instantaneous randomized response is parameterized with
another two probabilities p(i)3 , p
(i)
4 (Lines 13 and 15), similar
to p(i)1 , p
(i)
2 in the permanent randomized response. Now, these
four probability parameters jointly support tuning the tension
among privacy, effectiveness, and efficiency. More specifically,
p
(i)
5 = p
(i)
1 (p
(i)
3 − p(i)4 ) + p(i)4 , denoting the probability that an
index in client i’s real index set finally returns a “Yes” answer,
and p(i)6 = p
(i)
2 (p
(i)
3 −p(i)4 )+p(i)4 , denoting the probability that
an index not in client i’s real index set finally returns a “Yes”
answer, now play the same roles as p(i)1 and p
(i)
2 , respectively.
Detailed derivations of p(i)5 , p
(i)
6 are deferred to Section V-A.
Finally, we provide some comments on the above design.
First, our design is different from conventional locally dif-
ferentially private schemes (e.g., randomized response and
RAPPOR), which require each participating user to choose
the same probability parameters (i.e., ∀i ∈ C, p(i)1 = p1, p(i)2 =
p2, p
(i)
3 = p3, p
(i)
4 = p4), so that true statistics (e.g., heavy
hitter, histogram, and frequency) can be well estimated using
collected noisy answers, particularly after additional correc-
tions. Such a requirement/assumption is no longer needed
in our design because the cloud server, as the aggregator,
performs aggregate statistics based on secure aggregation
rather than over the noisy answers, e.g., counting how many
samples from the chosen clients involve a certain index in
total (Algorithm 1, Line 8). Therefore, as mentioned above,
different clients can customize probability parameters to tune
privacy and utility. Second, our index perturbation mechanism
in Algorithm 2 needs a prerequisite that the real index set of
a client does not change when she participates in different
communication rounds. Considering that the real index set
corresponds to the client’s local data, this prerequisite can be
further converted to the invariance of the client’s local data.
One feasible way to meet this prerequisite is to introduce the
concept of “period” into federated submodel learning, e.g., one
period can be set to one month. In a concrete period, a client
uses the historical data in the previous one period to participate
in federated submodel learning for several communication
rounds. In addition, when entering a new period, the client
just restarts Algorithm 2. The other feasible way is to allow
changes in a client’s real index set from one communication
round to another. This implies that the underlying binary states
of some indices may change. For example, if a client’s local
data and thus her real index set expand incrementally, some
indices, which were not in, can fall into the real index set
in later rounds. Recently, Erlingsson et al. [59] considered a
similar setting, in particular the collection of user statistics
(e.g., software adoption) for multiple times with each user
changing her underlying boolean value for a limited number
of times. Therefore, their design, based on binary tree and
Bernoulli distribution, can be leveraged to extend Algorithm 2,
allowing a client to change her local data and thus her real
index set in different communication rounds.
3) Private Set Union: We introduce the last module of
our design: private set union. We first briefly review related
work about private set operations, with a focus on the often
overlooked but significantly important private set union. Then,
we outline the practical infeasibility of existing protocols when
adapted to federated submodel learning. We finally present our
efficient and scalable scheme.
Algorithm 3: Private Set Union
Input: Client i’s real index set S(i) for all i ∈ C
Output: Union of real index sets
⋃
i∈C S(i)
1 Cloud server determines the partitions of the full index set S;
2 foreach Client i ∈ C do
3 Represents S(i) as a Bloom filter b(i);
4 Perturbs b(i) to an integer vector b′(i) by replacing each
bit 1 in b(i) with a random integer from ZR;
5 Uses a bit vector a(i) to indicate whether there exists an
element in S(i) falling into the partitions of S;
6 Perturbs a(i) to an integer vector a′(i) by replacing each
bit 1 in a(i) with a random integer from ZR;
7 Submits materials for securely aggregating b′(i),a′(i);
8 Cloud server obtains
∑
i∈C b
′(i) and
∑
i∈C a
′(i) with the
secure aggregation protocol, reconstructs the union
⋃
i∈C S(i),
and delivers
⋃
i∈C S(i) to each live client i ∈ Cˆ.
The goal of a private set operation protocol is to allow
multiple parties, where each party holds a private set, to
obtain the result of an operation over all the sets, without
revealing each individual private set and without introducing
a trusted third party. Compared with Private Set Intersection
(PSI) [72]–[77] and Private Set union Cardinality (PSC) [78]–
[80], which have received tremendous attention and also
have seen several practical applications, such as in social
networks [81], [82]; human genome testing [83]; location-
based services [84]; security incident information sharing [85];
online advertising [85]; private contact discovery [75]; and the
Tor anonymity network [86], there is little work and negligible
focus on Private Set Union (PSU). Nevertheless, private set
union promises a wide range of applications in practice, e.g.,
union queries over several databases, and, more generally,
integration/sharing of datasets from multiple private sources.
Thus, independent of federated submodel learning, the task of
designing a practical private set union protocol itself is highly
desired and urgent. Existing protocols mainly come from the
fields of data mining and cryptography. In the data mining
field, the representative design of private set union [87] is
based on commutative encryption and requires direct commu-
nication between any pair of two parties. Unfortunately, the
design leaks the cardinality of any two-party set intersection,
and the underlying commutative encryption is fragile as well.
In the cryptography field, according to the representation
format of a set, the protocols can be generally divided into
two categories: polynomial based [88]–[92] and Bloom filter
based [93]–[95]. For the polynomial-based protocols, elements
of a set are represented as the roots of a polynomial, and
the union of two sets is converted to the multiplication of
two polynomials. For the protocols based on Bloom filter,
the union operation over sets is normally transformed to the
element-wise OR operation over Bloom filters, as demon-
strated in Section III-B3, whereas the logic OR operation can
be further converted to bit addition and bit multiplication. To
obliviously perform addition and multiplication operations, the
above two kinds of protocols mainly turn to generic secure
two-party/multiparty computation (e.g., garbled circuit, homo-
morphic encryption, secret sharing, and oblivious transfer),
or outsource secure computation to multiple noncolluding
servers. Due to unaffordable computation and communication
overheads, none of the existing private set union protocols
have been deployed in practice. In addition to inefficiency, the
basic setting of these protocols significantly differs from that
of federated submodel learning, where clients cannot directly
communicate with each other and should mediate through an
untrusted cloud server. Additionally, the set elements here can
come from a billion-scale domain, which has not been touched
in previous work as of yet.
Given the infeasibility of existing protocols and the atypical
setting of federated submodel learning, we present our new
private set union scheme in Algorithm 3. First, each client
represents her real index set as a Bloom filter (Line 3). The
details about how to set the parameters of the Bloom filter
can be found in Section III-B3. Second, different from the
common practice to derive the union of sets by performing
bitwise OR operations over their Bloom filters, which re-
quires both addition and multiplication operations, we let the
cloud server directly sum the Bloom filters. Here, the sum
operation can be conducted obliviously and efficiently under
the coordination of the untrusted cloud server with secure
aggregation (Line 8). In addition, the resulting Bloom filter
is actually a counting Bloom filter, equivalent to constructing
it from scratch by sequentially inserting each real index set.
In addition to membership information, the counting Bloom
filter also contains the count numbers of elements in the
union of real index sets. In other words, the cloud server
may learn how many clients have a certain index, which is
undesired in our context. To prevent the leakage of count
numbers, we let each client generate a perturbed integer
vector, which replaces each bit 1 in her Bloom filter with
a random integer and keeps each bit 0 unchanged (Line 4).
Such a perturbation process can obscure count numbers while
retaining membership information. Third, after obtaining the
sum of perturbed Bloom filters, the cloud server can recover
the union of real index sets by doing membership tests for
the full index set. For example, to judge whether an index
belongs to the union, we check the resulting integer vector at
the positions of its hash values. The index is considered to be
in the union only if all the values are nonzero. However, one
practical issue arises: the domain of index can be huge, e.g.,
the full size of the goods IDs in Taobao is in the magnitude
of billions. Thus, it can be prohibitively time consuming to
enumerate all indices. Even worse, the direct enumeration
method can also introduce a large number of false positives in
the union, i.e., those indices not in the union are falsely judged
to be in, which can further lead to unnecessary redundancy in
the download and upload phases. To handle these problems,
we further incorporate a private “partition” union to narrow
down the scope of index for union reconstruction above. We
let the cloud server divide the full domain of the index into a
certain number of partitions ahead of time (Line 1). A good
partition scheme needs to well balance the pros in the union
reconstruction phase and the cons of additional cost. Given the
partitions, each client first uses a bit vector to record whether
there exists an index in her real index set falling into the
partitions (Line 5). Just the same as the Bloom filter to hide the
concrete count numbers, the client further replaces each bit 1
with a random integer (Line 6). Then, the cloud server obtains
the sum of the integer vectors using the secure aggregation
protocol and reveals those partitions with nonzero integers
in the corresponding positions. By simply doing membership
tests for the indices falling into these partitions, the cloud
server can efficiently construct the union. Last, the union is
delivered to all live clients (Line 8).
V. SECURITY AND PERFORMANCE ANALYSES
In this section, we first analyze the privacy guarantees of
our secure federated submodel learning scheme according to
Definition 1 and Definition 2, i.e., Theorem 1 and Theorem 2.
We also provide an instantiation of our scheme, where each
client consistently uses the union of the chosen clients’ real
index sets when interacting with the cloud server, and prove
that its security and privacy guarantees are as strong as conven-
tional federated learning with secure aggregation (hereinafter
also called “Secure Federated Learning” and abbreviated as
“SFL”), i.e., Theorem 3. We then show the proven security of
our proposed private set union protocol, i.e., Theorem 4. We
finally analyze the performance of our scheme by comparing
with that of secure federated learning.
A. Security and Privacy Analyses
By Definition 1, we analyze the local differential privacy
guarantee of index set perturbation in Algorithm 2. As stepping
stones, we first analyze permanent randomized response and a
one-time instantaneous randomized response in Lemma 1 and
Lemma 2, which impose an upper bound and a lower bound
on the privacy level of Algorithm 2, namely Theorem 1.
Lemma 1. Permanent randomized response in Algorithm 2 for
client i achieves local differential privacy at the level (i)∞ =
ln
(
max
(
p
(i)
1
p
(i)
2
,
p
(i)
2
p
(i)
1
,
1−p(i)1
1−p(i)2
,
1−p(i)2
1−p(i)1
))
.
Proof. We focus on a certain index j ∈ ⋃i∈C S(i). According
to Definition 1, we need to consider all possible pairs of inputs
from client i and all possible outputs of the permanent random-
ized response in Algorithm 2. Here, the input pair is j in and
not in client i’s real index set, namely j ∈ S(i) and j /∈ S(i).
In addition, the possible outputs are j obtaining “Yes” and
“No” noisy answers for memoization, namely j ∈ Y(i) and
j ∈ N (i). We thus can compute four ratios between the condi-
tional probabilities of a permanent output with a pair of distinct
inputs:
Pr(j∈Y(i)|j∈S(i))
Pr(j∈Y(i)|j /∈S(i)) =
p
(i)
1
p
(i)
2
,
Pr(j∈Y(i)|j /∈S(i))
Pr(j∈Y(i)|j∈S(i)) =
p
(i)
2
p
(i)
1
,
Pr(j∈N (i)|j∈S(i))
Pr(j∈N (i)|j /∈S(i)) =
1−p(i)1
1−p(i)2
, and
Pr(j∈N (i)|j /∈S(i))
Pr(j∈N (i)|j∈S(i)) =
1−p(i)2
1−p(i)1
.
By Definition 1, we can derive the level of local differential
privacy (i)∞ : exp
(

(i)
∞
)
= max
(
p
(i)
1
p
(i)
2
,
p
(i)
2
p
(i)
1
,
1−p(i)1
1−p(i)2
,
1−p(i)2
1−p(i)1
)
⇒

(i)
∞ = ln
(
max
(
p
(i)
1
p
(i)
2
,
p
(i)
2
p
(i)
1
,
1−p(i)1
1−p(i)2
,
1−p(i)2
1−p(i)1
))
.
Lemma 2. A one-time instantaneous randomized response in
Algorithm 2 for client i satisfies local differential privacy at the
level (i)1 , where 
(i)
1 = ln
(
max
(
p
(i)
5
p
(i)
6
,
p
(i)
6
p
(i)
5
,
1−p(i)5
1−p(i)6
,
1−p(i)6
1−p(i)5
))
,
p
(i)
5 = Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)|j ∈ S(i)) = p(i)1 (p(i)3 − p(i)4 )+p(i)4 , and
p
(i)
6 = Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)|j /∈ S(i)) = p(i)2 (p(i)3 − p(i)4 )+ p(i)4 .
Proof. The proof is similar to that of Lemma 1. The difference
is that the possible outputs are index j being in and not in the
final perturbed index set, namely j ∈ S ′′(i) and j /∈ S ′′(i).
We first compute two conditional probabilities p(i)5 and p
(i)
6 ,
denoting the probabilities of j in the final perturbed index set
given an index j is and is not in client i’s real index set,
respectively. In particular, we can derive p(i)5 through
p
(i)
5 = Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)
∣∣∣j ∈ S(i))
= Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)
∣∣∣j ∈ S(i), j ∈ Y(i))Pr(j ∈ Y(i)∣∣∣j ∈ S(i))
+ Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)
∣∣∣j ∈ S(i), j ∈ N (i))Pr(j ∈ N (i)∣∣∣j ∈ S(i))
(2)
= Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)
∣∣∣j ∈ Y(i))Pr(j ∈ Y(i)∣∣∣j ∈ S(i))
+ Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)
∣∣∣j ∈ N (i))Pr(j ∈ N (i)∣∣∣j ∈ S(i)) (3)
= p
(i)
3 p
(i)
1 + p
(i)
4
(
1− p(i)1
)
= p
(i)
1
(
p
(i)
3 − p(i)4
)
+ p
(i)
4 ,
where Equation (2) follows from the law of total probability,
and Equation (3) follows that j ∈ S ′′(i) is independent of
j ∈ S(i) conditioned on j ∈ Y(i) or j ∈ N (i). In a
similar way, we can get p(i)6 = Pr
(
j ∈ S ′′(i)∣∣j /∈ S(i)) =
p
(i)
2
(
p
(i)
3 − p(i)4
)
+ p
(i)
4 . Based on p
(i)
5 and p
(i)
6 , we can
still compute four ratios between the conditional probabil-
ities of an instantaneous output given a pair of different
inputs and draw the level of local differential privacy (i)1 =
ln
(
max
(
p
(i)
5
p
(i)
6
,
p
(i)
6
p
(i)
5
,
1−p(i)5
1−p(i)6
,
1−p(i)6
1−p(i)5
))
.
From the above deduction, we can draw that p(i)5 and p
(i)
6
in the instantaneous randomized response play the same roles
as p(i)1 and p
(i)
2 in the permanent randomized response. This
intuition has been given in Section IV-B2, and is now formally
verified here.
By combining the above two lemmas, we show the level of
local differential privacy ensured by Algorithm 2.
Theorem 1. When client i is chosen to participate in an arbi-
trary number of communication rounds, Algorithm 2 satisfies
(i)-local differential privacy, where (i)1 ≤ (i) ≤ (i)∞ .
Proof. We consider that client i participates in k commu-
nication rounds of federated submodel learning, and Algo-
rithm 2 guarantees (i)k -local differential privacy. Thus, client
i should generate k instantaneous randomized responses. On
one hand, suppose that an attacker only leverages the k-th
instantaneous randomized response while ignoring all previous
k − 1 instantaneous randomized responses. This corresponds
to the strongest possible local differential privacy guarantee,
namely the lower bound on (i)k . According to Lemma 2, a
one-time instantaneous randomized response guarantees (i)1 -
local differential privacy. Therefore, (i)1 ≤ (i)k . On the other
hand, if the attacker leverages all k instantaneous randomized
responses, and as k approaches positive infinity, the worst
case is that the attacker reveals the permanent randomized
response. This corresponds to the weakest possible local
differential privacy guarantee, namely the upper bound on

(i)
k . By Lemma 1, the permanent randomized response can
guarantee (i)∞ -local differential privacy. Hence, 
(i)
k ≤ (i)∞ .
We complete the proof.
In fact, to derive the detailed local differential privacy
guarantee when client i participates in k communication
rounds, namely (i)k , we need to make an additional assumption
on how effectively the attacker infers client i’s permanent
randomized response from all k instantaneous randomized
responses. We defer this explorative problem as our future
work. Additionally, if we set p(i)1 = p
(i)
2 = p
(i)
3 = p
(i)
4 = 1,
implying p(i)5 = p
(i)
6 = 1, 
(i)
1 = 0, 
(i)
∞ = 0, and (i) = 0, this
corresponds to that any index, no matter whether it is or is
not in client i’s real index set, will receive a permanent “Yes”
answer and an instantaneous “Yes” answer. In other words,
if client i takes the union of the chosen clients’ real index
sets as her perturbed index set, the local differential privacy
guarantee of Algorithm 2 is 0, which is the strongest case, as
in conventional federated learning.
We next analyze our secure submodel updates aggregation
in Algorithm 1, according to Definition 2.
Theorem 2. Algorithm 1 is a client-controllable privacy
protection mechanism for submodel updates aggregation. In
particular, for any index j ∈ ⋃i∈C S(i), we let nj,0 and
nj,1 denote the numbers of live clients who do not have and
have j in reality, respectively. If each live client chooses the
same probability parameters (i.e., ∀i ∈ Cˆ, p(i)1 = p1, p(i)2 =
p2, p
(i)
3 = p3, p
(i)
4 = p4, p5 = p1(p3 − p4) + p4, and
p6 = p2(p3−p4)+p4), then Algorithm 1 can guarantee: Event
1 happens with probability p7 = p5(1−p5)nj,1−1(1−p6)nj,0 ,
and Event 2 happens with probability p8 = (1 − p5)nj,1(1 −
(1− p6)nj,0).
Proof. Event 1 happens when only one of the nj,1 clients who
have j in reality submits a nonzero update while all nj,0 clients
who do not have j in reality also do not submit zero updates.
By the product rule, we can compute the joint probability of
Event 1 as p7 = p5(1− p5)nj,1−1(1− p6)nj,0 .
Event 2 happens when all nj,1 clients who have j in reality
do not submit nonzero updates. Under such a circumstance,
if part (at least one) of nj,0 clients who do not have j in
reality submit zero updates, from the aggregate zero update,
the cloud server almost ascertains that these clients do not have
j in reality. According to the product rule, we can compute
the probability of Event 2 as p8 = (1 − p5)nj,1(1 − (1 −
p6)
nj,0).
Theorem 2 enables participating clients to jointly adjust
the privacy level of secure submodel updates aggregation by
choosing different probability parameters. Details on fine-
tuning are deferred to Appendix A. Additionally, we still
examine the case that each client uses the union of the chosen
clients’ real index sets to upload the submodel update by
setting p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 1, implying p5 = p6 = 1
and p7 = p8 = 0. This is the strongest possible client-
controllable privacy for secure submodel updates aggregation,
as in secure federated learning. Combining with the local
differential privacy guarantee, we can see that secure federated
submodel learning with the setting p1 = p2 = p3 = p4 = 1
holds the same security and privacy levels as secure federated
learning under both Definition 1 and Definition 2. We further
generalize this observation in Theorem 3, which is free of any
security or privacy definition.
Theorem 3. If the probability parameters p(i)1 , p
(i)
2 , p
(i)
3 , p
(i)
4
all take 1s for each chosen client i ∈ C, the security and
privacy of secure federated submodel learning scheme in
Algorithm 1 are as strong as secure federated learning.
Proof. We consider any index j from the full index set S (i.e.,
j ∈ S), and prove in two complementary cases as follows.
Case 1 (j ∈ ⋃i∈C S(i)): In both secure federated submodel
learning and secure federated learning, each client i ∈ C
will download j-th row of the full model and then upload
the update of this row to the cloud server through secure
aggregation. Specifically, if j is not in a client’s real index set,
then this client will upload a zero vector. The whole processes
of two schemes are consistent, implying the same security and
privacy guarantees.
Case 2 (j /∈ ⋃i∈C S(i)): In secure federated submodel
learning, each client will not download j-th row and also will
not upload the zero vector. Thus, the adversary knows that
each client doesn’t not have index j (i.e., ∀i ∈ C, j /∈ S(i)),
and each client’s update is a zero vector. In contrast, in secure
federated learning, each client will download j-th row and
update a zero vector as her update. From the result that the
aggregate update is a zero vector, the adversary still ascertains
that each client does not have j and her update is a zero vector,
which are the same as in secure federated submodel learning.
By summarizing two cases, we complete the proof.
We finally analyze the security of private set union. As
a springboard, we give Lemma 3, which states that the
modular addition of one or more random integers from ZR =
{0, 1, . . . , R−1} is still uniformly random in ZR. We note that
the elementary operation in secure aggregation [18] is modular
addition with a large modulus rather than original addition,
which is consistent with Lemma 3. In addition, in the field of
number theory, the set of integers ZR = {0, 1, 2, . . . , R − 1}
is called the least residue system modulo R, or the ring of the
integers modulo R. Moreover, the set ZR together with the
operation of modular addition form a finite cyclic group.
Lemma 3. For any nonempty set C1 6= ∅ and for all
i ∈ C1, ri is randomly and independently chosen from
ZR = {0, 1, . . . , R− 1}, denoted as ri ∈R ZR, then
∑
i∈C1 ri
mod R is still uniformly random in ZR.
Proof. We prove by induction on the cardinality of C1, denoted
as |C1|, where |C1| ≥ 1.
The base case is to show that the statement holds for |C1| =
1. We let {ra} denote the element, where ra ∈R ZR. Thus, it
is trivial that
∑
i∈C1 ri mod R = ra ∈R ZR.
The inductive step is to prove that if the statement for any
nonempty C¯1 ⊂ C1 holds, then the statement for C¯1
⋃{b}
where b /∈ C¯1, b ∈ C1 still holds. We let ra denote
∑
i∈C¯1 ri
mod R. Hence, it suffices to show that ra ∈R ZR, rb ∈R
ZR ⇒ (ra + rb) mod R ∈R ZR. We prove this statement by
showing Pr((ra + rb) = r mod R) = 1/R for any r ∈ ZR.
The detailed deduction is shown as follows:
Pr ((ra + rb) = r mod R)
=
R−1∑
k=0
Pr (ra = k, rb = r − k mod R)
=
R−1∑
k=0
Pr (ra = k) Pr (rb = r − k mod R) (4)
=
R−1∑
k=0
1
R
1
R
=
1
R
,
where Equation (4) follows that ra, rb are independent.
By mathematical induction, we complete the proof.
Theorem 4. The private set union protocol in Algorithm 3 is
proven secure in the sense that only the union of the chosen
clients’ real index sets is revealed.
Proof. We recall that in Algorithm 3, a client first represents
her real index set as a Bloom filter b(i), then replaces bit 1s
with random integers, denoted as b′(i), and finally executes
secure aggregation with other clients under the coordination
of the cloud server. Additionally, just in the same manner
as computing the union, the client joins in the survey of
whether there exists an index in her real index set falling into
predivided partitions. Hence, for the sake of conciseness, we
here only elaborate on secure union computation.
First, according to the security analysis in [18], the secure
aggregation protocol is proven secure in both honest-but-
curious and active adversary settings, where the adversaries
can be the cloud server and participating clients. In more
detail, from security and robustness, the secure aggregation
protocol can guarantee that nothing but the aggregate result
is revealed to the cloud server and all participating clients
even if part of clients may drop out during the aggregation
process. When the secure aggregation guarantee applies to our
context, only
∑
i∈C b
′(i) is revealed, while any individual b′(i)
for i ∈ C is concealed from both the cloud server and the other
chosen clients C\{i}. Given that b′(i) is a postprocessing of
b(i), the underlying Bloom filter b(i) and thus each client i’s
real index set S(i) are obscured.
Second, we prove that the revealed sum
∑
i∈C b
′(i) contains
no information other than the union
∨
i∈C b
(i) from the view
of adversary with any prior knowledge. Considering both∨
i∈C b
(i) and
∑
i∈C b
′(i) are element-wise operation, we thus
just need to focus on one-dimensional cases of b(i) and
b′(i), i.e., b(i) degenerates to one bit b(i) ∈ {0, 1} and
b′(i) degenerates to one random integer b′(i) ∈ ZR. We now
consider two complementary cases of {b(i)|i ∈ C} as follows.
Case 1 (∀i ∈ C, b(i) = 0): The union ∨i∈C b(i) = 0 is the
same as the
∑
i∈C b
′(i) = 0. This implies nothing but the union
is leaked from the sum in Case 1.
Case 2 (∃i ∈ C, b(i) = 1): The union is ∨i∈C b(i) = 1.
We compute the sum
∑
i∈C b
′(i) by splitting C into two parts:
C0 = {i|i ∈ C, b(i) = 0} and C1 = {i|i ∈ C, b(i) = 1}. Then,
we can derive ∑
i∈C
b′(i) =
∑
i∈C0
b′(i) +
∑
i∈C1
b′(i)
= 0 +
∑
i∈C1
b′(i)
∈R ZR. (5)
Here, Equation (5) holds as follows. According to the an-
tecedent ∃i ∈ C, b(i) = 1, we have C1 6= ∅. Additionally,
in Algorithm 3 (Line 4), if b(i) = 1, we have b′(i) ∈R ZR.
Now, by using Lemma 3, we have
∑
i∈C1 b
′(i) ∈R ZR. This
indicates that the sum is just a uniformly random integer to the
adversary’s view. Furthermore, in the context of union, (1) this
random integer takes positive values with probability 1−1/R
and is further decoded as element “1”; (2) the random integer
takes value 0 with a negligible probability 1/R and further
is wrongly2 decoded as element “0”, i.e., a false negative
happens with a negligible probability 1/R. Hence, the sum
reveals nothing but the union in Case 2.
By incorporating no leakage of any individual real index
set and no leakage but the union from the aggregate result,
we complete the proof.
We give more interpretations about the word “only” in
Theorem 4. With no exception, the count number of each
element in the union (i.e., the cardinality of C1 in the proof) is
also hidden. The reason is that for any non-empty C1, the sum
is uniformly random (i.e., Equation (5) holds). This further
indicates that from the sum, all possible C1’s are computa-
tionally indistinguishable to the adversary. In other words, the
adversary learns the exact cardinality with probability 1/|C|,
which is the same as the probability of a random guess among
all possible cardinalities {1, 2, . . . , |C|}.
B. Performance Analysis and Comparison
We now analyze the performance of our proposed secure
federated submodel learning scheme. We first analyze the
2Even if each bit “1” is replaced with a positive rather than non-negative
integer, the sum under modular addition can still take value 0 with a negligible
probability. However, the sum can be no longer uniformly random.
TABLE III
COMPLEXITIES OF SECURE FEDERATED LEARNING (SFL) AND SECURE
FEDERATED SUBMODEL LEARNING (SFSL) AT THE SAME SECURITY AND
PRIVACY LEVELS AS WELL AS PRIVATE SET UNION (PSU) IN SFSL.
Communication Computation Storage
Client
SFL O(n+md) O(n2 + nmd) O(n+md)
SFSL O(nsd) O(n2sd) O(nsd)
PSU O(ns) O(n2s) O(ns)
Server
SFL O(n2 + nmd) O(n2md) O(n2 +md)
SFSL O(n2sd) O(n3sd) O(n2 + nsd)
PSU O(n2s) O(n3s) O(n2 + ns)
*|⋃i∈C S(i)|  |S| ⇒ ns m.
communication, computation, and storage (including both
memory and disk loads) complexities of the client and the
cloud server. Then, we introduce secure federated learning as
a benchmark for comparison. For clarity, Table III summarizes
the complexities of two secure schemes at the same levels
of security and privacy along with the complexities of our
proposed private set union protocol.
1) Performance of Secure Federated Submodel Learning:
We focus on a certain communication round. For a concrete
phase within the round, e.g., private set union or secure
submodel updates and count vectors aggregations, we consider
that all n chosen clients are alive at the beginning, but may
drop out during the process, which imposes upper bounds
on the overheads of the phase. In addition, for feasibility
and clarity in analysis, we let each client choose the same
probability parameters p1, p2, p3, p4, resulting in the same
p5, p6. Moreover, we assume that the expected cardinality
of each client’s real index set is s, which indicates that the
expected cardinality of the union of n chosen clients’ real
index sets
⋃
i∈C S(i) is upper bounded by ns. Here, ns is much
less than the cardinality of the full index set m. Furthermore,
the expected cardinality of each client’s perturbed index set
S ′′(i) is upper bounded by sp5 +(n−1)sp6, and the expected
cardinality of each client’s succinct index set S(i)⋂S ′′(i) is
sp5. In what follows, we first present the detailed complexity
formulas containing the probability parameters p5, p6 and then
instantiate with p5 = p6 = 1. This corresponds to that each
client uses the union of all chosen clients’ real index sets to
interact with the cloud server. As demonstrated in Theorem 3,
this case can provide the same levels of privacy and security as
secure federated learning. Further, given 0 ≤ p5, p6 ≤ 1 while
the complexities are non-decreasing with p5, p6, this case still
upper bounds the complexities of our scheme.
First regards the communication complexities of the client
and the cloud server. Each client’s communication overhead
can be broken up as: (1) Participating in the private set union
protocol, where two vectors need to be securely aggregated,
and the final union result needs to be downloaded with size
O(ns). The first vector is the perturbed Bloom filter with size
β, and the second vector is the perturbed indicator vector with
a preset constant size. According to Equation (1), the optimal
length of Bloom filter β is proportional to the cardinality of
the set to be filtered φ, here the cardinality of the union of
n chosen clients’ real index sets, which implies that β ∝
φ = O(ns). Therefore, the communication complexity of each
client in private set union is O(n+ns+ns) = O(ns), where
O(n+ns) corresponds to the cost of securely aggregating the
perturbed Bloom filters and is obtained by letting the size of
vector l in Table II take O(ns); (2) Downloading the training
hyperparameters as well as the submodel with the perturbed
index set S ′′(i), namely a (sp5 + (n− 1)sp6)× d matrix; (3)
Uploading the weighted submodel update and corresponding
count vector with respect the perturbed index set through
secure aggregation. In particular, the total size of vector to be
securely aggregated with at most n− 1 other clients is (sp5 +
(n−1)sp6)(d+1). According to Table II, the communication
complexity of this part is O(n+(sp5 +(n−1)sp6)(d+1)). In
summary, the total communication complexity of each client is
O(ns)+O((sp5+(n−1)sp6)d)+O(n+(sp5+(n−1)sp6)(d+
1)) = O(ns+ (sp5 + (n− 1)sp6)(2d+ 1)). If the probability
parameters p5, p6 both take the value 1, the communication
complexity of each client is O(nsd). Correspondingly, the
cloud server’s communication cost can be broken up into: (1)
Working as a mediation in the private set union protocol, and
delivering the union result to clients with O(n2s) communica-
tion cost. Hence, the communication complexity of the cloud
server in private set union is O(n2 + n2s + n2s) = O(n2s),
where O(n2 + n2s) is related to secure aggregation; (2)
Returning training hyperparameters and requested submodels
to clients with O(n+ n(sp5 + (n− 1)sp6)d) communication
cost; (3) Working as a mediation in the secure aggregations
of weighted submodel updates and count vectors. Its com-
munication complexity is O(n2 + n(sp5 + (n − 1)sp6)(d +
1)). Overall, the cloud server’s communication complexity is
O(n2s) + O(n + n(sp5 + (n − 1)sp6)d) + O(n2 + n(sp5 +
(n−1)sp6)(d+1)) = O(n2s+n(sp5 +(n−1)sp6)(2d+1)).
We still examine that when p5 = p6 = 1, the communication
complexity of the cloud server is O(n2sd).
Second regards time complexities. Despite of the local train-
ing phase, the computation cost of each client is dominated
by: (1) Perturbing the real index set, which costs O(ns) time.
Here, one set lookup operation can be implemented with O(1)
complexity; (2) Participating in the secure aggregation based
stages, including private set union and secure weighted sub-
model updates and count vectors aggregations, which consume
O(n2+n2s) = O(n2s) and O(n2+n(sp5+(n−1)sp6)(d+1))
time, respectively. Thus, the overall time complexity of each
client is O(ns) +O(n2s) +O(n2 + n(sp5 + (n− 1)sp6)(d+
1)) = O(n2s+n(sp5+(n−1)sp6)(d+1)). When p5 = p6 = 1,
it turns to O(n2sd). Correspondingly, the computation over-
head of the cloud server is dominated by mediating private set
union and secure aggregations of weighted submodel updates
and count vectors, which consume O(n2ns) = O(n3s) and
O(n2(sp5 + (n − 1)sp6)(d + 1)) time, respectively, and
O(n3s + n2(sp5 + (n − 1)sp6)(d + 1)) time in total. When
p5 = p6 = 1, the cloud server’s time complexity is O(n3sd).
Third regards storage complexities. Each client’s storage
overhead comes from: (1) Storing the materials in private
set union and in secure aggregations of weighted submodel
updates and count vectors, which occupy O(n+ns) = O(ns)
and O(n + (sp5 + (n − 1)sp6)(d + 1)) space, respectively;
(2) Storing her permanent answers, which occupies O(ns)
space. Thus, the storage overhead of each client is O(ns) +
O(n + (sp5 + (n − 1)sp6)(d + 1)) + O(ns) = O(ns +
(sp5 + (n − 1)sp6)(d + 1)) in total. When p5 = p6 = 1,
the client does not need to store the permanent answers any
more, and her storage overhead is O(nsd). Correspondingly,
the cloud server’s storage overhead can be broken up into:
(1) Storing the materials in private set union and in secure
weighted submodel updates and count vectors aggregations,
which occupy O(n2+ns) and O(n2+(sp5+(n−1)sp6)(d+1))
space, respectively; (2) Storing n chosen clients’ perturbed
index sets, which occupies O(n(sp5 + (n− 1)sp6)) space. In
summary, the overall storage overhead of the cloud server is
O(n2+ns)+O(n2+(sp5+(n−1)sp6)(d+1))+O(n(sp5+(n−
1)sp6)) = O(n
2 +ns+(sp5 +(n−1)sp6)(n+d+1)). When
p5 = p6 = 1, the cloud server does not need to store clients’
perturbed index sets, and her storage overhead is O(n2+nsd).
2) Comparison with Secure Federated Learning: We first
analyze the complexities of secure federated learning. Each
client’s communication overhead mainly comes from: (1)
Downloading the full model, namely a m × d matrix; (2)
Uploading the update of the full model through the secure
aggregation protocol with O(n + md) complexity, which is
obtained by letting the size of vector l in Table II take md.
Thus, the overall communication complexity of each client is
O(n+md). In correspondence, the cloud server’s communi-
cation cost comes from: (1) Sending the full model to all n
clients, with complexity O(nmd); (2) Working as a mediation
in the secure aggregation of the full model updates, with com-
plexity O(n2 +nmd). Thus, the cloud server’s communication
complexity is O(n2 + nmd). Regardless of the local training
phase, the computation and storage overheads of each client
and the cloud server are dominated by secure aggregation.
In particular, the time complexities of each client and the
cloud server are O(n2 + nmd) and O(n2md), respectively.
Additionally, the storage complexities of each client and the
cloud server are O(n+md) and O(n2 +md), respectively.
We next compare our secure scheme with secure federated
learning at the same security and privacy levels, i.e., all the
probability parameters in our scheme are set to 1. Given that
the cardinality of the union of n chosen clients’ real index sets
is much smaller than the cardinality of the full index set (i.e.,
|⋃i∈C S(i)|  |S| ⇒ ns  m), we can draw from Table III
that the complexities of each client and the cloud server in
our secure federated submodel learning are both much lower
than those in secure federated learning. We can further derive
from Table III that our secure scheme is quite scalable because
its complexities are independent of the size of the full model,
which is controlled by the number of total rows m.
We finally compare the overheads, typically the computation
and memory overheads, of each client in the local training
phase under two secure frameworks. We mainly focus on the
TABLE IV
STATISTICS OF TAOBAO DATASET.
Type #User(s) #Goods #Categories #Samples
Test (Full) 24,790 138,829 4,758 1,010,284
Train (Full) 49,023 143,534 4,815 15,854,357
Train (Per Client) 1 301 117 323
size of local model/submodel. For secure federated learning,
each client trains the full model W with size md. In contrast,
for our secure federated submodel learning, each client trains
the succinct submodel WS(i)⋂S′′(i) with size sp5d, which is
sd when p5 = 1. Given md nsd > sd ≥ sp5d, we can find
that our secure scheme is still far more efficient than secure
federated learning in the local training phase.
VI. EVALUATION
In this section, we introduce our evaluation results from
model accuracy and convergency, practical computation, com-
munication, and storage overheads.
Dataset: We use an industrial dataset built from 30-day
impression and click logs of Taobao users from June 15, 2019
to July 15, 2019. For a certain Taobao user, we leverage her
click behaviors in previous 14 days as historical data to predict
her click and non-click behaviors in the following 1 day. We
leave out the samples within the last 1 day as the target items
of the test set while putting the others into the training set.
Specifically, the test set is located at the cloud server to judge
the accuracy and convergency of the global model. In contrast,
for the full training set, we further cluster each Taobao user’s
data as a training set located at a client. Some statistical
information about the numbers of Taobao users, goods IDs,
category IDs, and samples, in the test set, the full training set,
and one client’s training set is shown in Table IV.
Model, Hyperparameters, and Metrics: We take the Deep
Interest Network (DIN) [4] as the e-commerce recommenda-
tion model for federated submodel learning, where the number
of columns in the embedding matrix is set to 18. Except the
embedding layer for user IDs, goods IDs, and category IDs,
the parameters of the other network layers in DIN, including
the attention layer and the fully connected layer, are of size
64,327. Hence, the global model at the cloud server is of
size 3,617,023, whereas a desired submodel at the client is
of size 71,869 in average, which is only 1.99% of the global
model’s size and roughly requires 0.27MB space using 32-
bit representation. For each client’s local training, we choose
mini-batch SGD as the optimization algorithm, set the batch
size to 2, and set the local epoch number to 1. In addition, we
initially set the learning rate to 1 and further apply exponential
decay with the decay rate of 0.999 per communication round.
For the cloud server’s global testing, we adopt a golden metric
in the task of Click-Through Rate (CTR) prediction, called
Area Under the Curve (AUC), and set the batch size to 1,024.
Prototypes and Configurations: We implemented proto-
types of our secure federated submodel learning and secure
federated learning in Python 2.7.16. Due to the synchro-
nization requirement of secure aggregation, we adopted a
synchronous architecture on top as suggested by Google’s
deployment practice [40], where the cloud server delivers
instructions to chosen clients, waits for them to finish their
tasks, and then moves on to the next step. In particular,
we implemented a communication module between the cloud
server and each client with standard socket programming.
In addition, we used TensorFlow 1.12.0 to implement DIN.
Moreover, we mainly used PyCryptodome 3.7.3 to implement
the secure aggregation protocol: Diffie-Hellman key exchange
was implemented over RFC 3526 Group 14, which is a 2048-
bit modular exponential (MODP) group [96]; the secret shar-
ing adopted the standard Shamir’s version; the authenticated
encryption used Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) in the
Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) mode, where the secret key
is set to be 128-bit long; Pseudo-Random Number Generator
(PRNG) was implemented using Hash-based Message Authen-
tication Code (HMAC) suggested by NIST SP 800-90A [97],
and the security strength takes 128 bits.
Our running environment is a Linux workstation with 64-
bit Ubuntu 18.04.2 OS. The processor is Intel(R) Core(TM)
i9-9900K with 8 cores, the base frequency is 3.60GHz, the
memory size is 64GB, and the cache size is 16MB. The
workstation is also equipped with 2 NVIDIA’s GeForce RTX
2080 Ti graphics cards. In our evaluation, to manifest the
resource differentiation between clients and the cloud server,
from hardware, we ran all the clients only on CPU, but
allowed the cloud server to accelerate her operations using
GPU. Additionally, from parallelism and concurrency, we
optimized some of the cloud server’s hotspot functions with
the multiprocessing library in Python.
Implementation Overview: We revisit some key points and
also present more implementation details when our secure
federated submodel learning is instantiated with Taobao’s
e-commerce recommendation. The cloud server chooses n
clients, namely n Taobao users, in every communication
round, where n can range from 20 to 100 with a step of
20. Each chosen client extracts goods IDs from her data as
her real index set. Then, she joins in private set union to
obtain the union of n chosen clients’ goods IDs. In our Taobao
dataset, the maximum size of the union of 100 clients’ goods
IDs reaches 32,904, which corresponds to the cardinality of
set to be filtered φ. From Equation (1), we can derive that
the optimal length of Bloom filter β should be 630,774 at a
desired false positive rate of 0.01%. This is larger than the
total number of goods IDs 143,534 involved in this Taobao
dataset. Thus, we set the length of Bloom filter to be 143,534,
take an identity map as the only hash function, and omit the
partition steps. The false positive rate now is 0. In addition,
we set the modulus R to 232 in private set union, and any
false negative due to modular addition in recovering union
never happened throughout our evaluation. It is worth noting
that our evaluation results of private set union presented here
can sufficiently embody the practical case, where the full size
of the goods IDs in Taobao scales to billions. The reason is
TABLE V
CHOICES OF PROBABILITY PARAMETERS (CPPS) AND RESULTING
PRIVACY LEVELS.
p1, p3 p2, p4 p5 p6 1 ∞ p7 p8
CPP1 1 0 1 0 ∞ ∞ 86.7% 0
CPP2 15/16 1/16 88.3% 11.7% 2.02 2.71 0 10.3%
CPP3 7/8 1/8 78.1% 21.9% 1.27 1.95 0 19.5%
CPP4 3/4 1/4 62.5% 37.5% 0.51 1.10 0 34.2%
CPP5 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0
*Smaller 1, ∞, p7, and p8 indicate better privacy.
that as shown in Table III, the overheads of our private set
union scheme only hinge on the number of chosen clients n
and the optimal length of Bloom filter β, where the latter is
independent of the domain of the represented set’s elements
and is at the same level of 143,534 evaluated here.
After obtaining the union of goods IDs, each client runs
Algorithm 2 to generate a set of perturbed goods IDs. For
clarity in presenting results, we let each client use the same
Choice of Probability Parameters (CPP). Table V lists 5 CPPs
in our evaluation and their resulting privacy levels of index set
perturbation and secure submodel updates aggregation, where
the number of chosen clients is 100 for the secure submodel
updates aggregation. We provide some insights from Table V
as follows: (1) CPP1 corresponds to the worst local differential
privacy guarantee where each client reveals her real goods
IDs, while CPP5 corresponds to the best privacy guarantee as
strong as secure federated learning where each client uses the
union of chosen clients’ goods IDs as her perturbed index set.
Additionally, as the serial number of CPP becomes larger, the
local differential privacy guarantee is stronger; (2) the resulting
p7 = 86.7% at CPP1 indicates that if each chosen client
submits the submodel update using her real goods IDs, then
Event 1 (i.e., from the securely aggregated submodel update,
the cloud server ascertains that some goods ID belongs to a
concrete client and also learns the detailed update with respect
to this goods ID.) happens with probability 86.7%. This further
implies that 86.7% of the goods IDs in the union of 100 chosen
clients’ real goods IDs involve single client. Therefore, we
can draw that user data in our e-commerce context is highly
heterogeneous, and the truly required submodels of different
clients are highly differentiated; (3) with CPP from CPP2
to CPP5, the cloud server cannot ensure that any goods ID
belongs to some client from the aggregate submodel update
and also cannot learn any client’s detailed update, namely
Event 1 happens with probability p7 = 0; and (4) with
CPP from CPP2 to CPP4, the proportion of each client’s real
goods IDs falling into her perturbed goods IDs controlled by
p5 decreases, while the proportion of redundant goods IDs
controlled by p6 increases. Hence, the proportion of aggregate
zero updates grows, implying a higher probability p8 of the
cloud server in ascertaining that a certain goods ID does not
belong to some client. Further, given an observation that p8 is
approaching 1− p5, we can still draw that the real goods IDs
of different Taobao users are highly differentiated.
Based on the perturbed goods IDs, each client can fur-
ther generate the perturbed category IDs by leveraging the
global mapping between goods IDs and category IDs, which
is publicly shared among all clients and the cloud server.
Upon receiving the perturbed goods IDs from a client, the
cloud server can still generate her perturbed category IDs,
thus returning a submodel to the client. Here, the submodel
returned to the client comprises the embedding vectors for
her perturbed goods and category IDs as well as the other
network parameters of DIN. In addition, the client should not
generate perturbed goods and category IDs independently by
running Algorithm 2 twice. The reason is that there exist strong
correlations, particularly a surjective but not injective mapping,
between goods IDs and category IDs, whereas independent
randomized responses to dependent questions can lead to
inconsistency and may leak information about true answers
to the adversary. Therefore, we should apply randomized
response to major questions and then generate answers to sec-
ondary/correlated questions via their dependence relationships,
which can keep consistency. For example, suppose you are
asked two types of questions: one type is about whether you
have a certain fruit by enumerating all possible fruits, such as
“Do you have an apple?” or “Do you have a banana?”; the
other type is about whether you have the category fruit. To
preserve plausible deniability and consistency of your answers,
you should simply apply randomized response to the first type
of questions, and then directly respond to the second question
based on the noisy answers to the first type of questions.
In other words, if you respond any “Yes” to the first type
of questions, then you should respond “Yes” to the second
question; otherwise, you should respond “No”.
By performing set intersection between real and perturbed
goods IDs, each client obtains her succinct set of goods IDs
and also gets her succinct set of category IDs based on the
global goods-category mapping. Then, the client extracts her
succinct submodel from the downloaded submodel and also
extracts her succinct training set from the original training set
by following two rules: (1) For the goods ID to be predicted
in a sample, if it does not belong to the succinct set of
goods IDs, this sample will be filtered out; and (2) for the
sequence of historical goods IDs in a sample, we only keep
those goods IDs in the succinct set of goods IDs as well as
their corresponding category IDs. Of course, if none of goods
IDs are left in the historical sequence, this sample will be
filtered out. Afterwards, each client trains her succinct model,
obtains the update of the submodel, and prepares the weighted
submodel update and the count vector to be uploaded.
To facilitate the cloud server in obliviously adding up the
weighted submodel updates based on secure aggregation, the
float-type parameters need to be converted to integers so that
modular addition is supported. One common practice is that
each client first scales up the parameters through multiplying
by a large constant (e.g., a power of 2), and only keeps the
integral parts. Later, the cloud server scales down the aggregate
result through dividing by the same constant. Different from
the common scaling technique, in this work, we perform float-
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Fig. 4. Accuracies and convergencies of global model in centralized training,
Secure Federated Submodel Learning (SFSL) with different Choices of
Probability Parameters (CPPs), and conventional Federated Learning (FL).
to-integer conversion in a new manner, particularly by means
of a celebrated model compression algorithm, called stochastic
γ-level quantization [29], which maps each parameter into
{0, 1, . . . , 2γ−1}. The detailed procedure is shown as follows:
Each client first compresses her submodel update and then
weights the parameters in the compressed submodel update
by multiplying with corresponding count numbers. After the
secure aggregation, the cloud server gets the sum of the
weighted compressed submodel updates, and then divides by
corresponding total count numbers. Finally, the cloud server
applies the decompression algorithm and updates the global
model by adding the aggregate submodel update. We note
that the postprocessing with a weighted average/mean in the
compressed space does not introduce any bias/error to the final
decompressed result. Detailed proof is deferred to Appendix B.
Furthermore, in our following evaluation, we set γ to 215
and set the modulus in the secure aggregation of weighted
compressed submodel updates to 232.
A. Model Accuracy and Convergency
We bring in centralized training and conventional federated
learning as two baselines and plot their AUCs as well as the
AUCs of our secure federated submodel learning with different
CPPs in Fig. 4. Here, the number of chosen clients in each
communication round n is set to 100, and the total number of
communication rounds is set to 5,000. In addition, centralized
training refers to the traditional case that the cloud server first
collects data from all clients, then trains the DIN model, and
tests the model once training over the samples with a similar
size to the total size of n chosen clients’ datasets.
From Fig. 4, we can see that compared with centralized
training, which reaches the highest AUC of 0.641 in 803
communication rounds, our secure federated submodel learn-
ing with CPP2 achieves the highest AUC of 0.615 in 4,908
communication rounds, slightly decreasing by 0.026. In con-
trast, conventional federated learning performs worst among
all schemes, only achieving the highest AUC of 0.543 in 867
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Fig. 5. Total communication and computation overheads of the client and the cloud server per communication round in Secure Federated Submodel Learning
(SFSL) with different Choices of Probability Parameters (CPPs) and Secure Federated Learning (SFL).
communication rounds. Even worse, it does not converge to
a good model at the end of many communication rounds3.
The major reason for conventional federated learning not
working well in the e-commerce recommendation context
is that it coarsely computes the weighted average of the
clients’ updates of the full model proportional to their training
set sizes, no matter whether one client’s whole training set
actually involves some network parameters (the full model
excluding her submodel, e.g., some embedding vectors here),
thus inaccurately counting in the weights (i.e., the training set
sizes) of those clients who contribute zero/no updates for these
network parameters. In addition, with a higher heterogeneity
of user data and thus a higher differentiation of submodels, the
roughness and inaccuracy of conventional federated learning
will be exposed more completely, which clarifies why it can
work in the natural language context with a 10,000 word
vocabulary considered by Google, but does not work well in
our e-commerce context with billion-scale goods IDs. More
thorough demonstrations are deferred to Appendix C.
From Fig. 4, we can also observe some differences among
the AUCs of our secure federated submodel learning with dif-
ferent CPPs. In particular, secure federated submodel learning
with CPP4 is the worst among all CPPs, and it achieves the
highest AUC of 0.601, decreasing by 0.014 compared with
CPP2. We clarify the reason through the resulting probabilities
p5’s of different CPPs listed in Table V, where p5 denotes the
probability that an index in a client’s real index set finally
is put into her perturbed index set, and it dominates the
size of the client’s succinct training set. Further considering
the process of generating the succinct training set in our
evaluation, in addition to the size of each client’s factual local
training samples, p5 also controls the length of historical goods
and category IDs in every sample. Thus, a smaller p5 tends
to imply worse model performance in general. This accounts
for different model performances under CPP2 and CPP4, and
3We have tried several different pairs of an initial learning rate and a
decay rate and all observed divergences in conventional federated learning.
For example, when the initial learning rate is 4, and the exponential decay
rate is 0.996, conventional federated learning achieves the best AUC of 0.554
in 230 rounds but diverges to 0.503 at the end of 5,000 rounds.
also explains the observation that CPP1 and CPP5, sharing the
same p5 = 1, have identical model performance.
B. Communication Overhead
We show the total communication overhead of secure fed-
erated submodel learning and first introduce secure federated
learning as a baseline. Fig. 5(a) plots the communication
overhead per client per communication round. Here, we do not
plot the communication overhead of the cloud server, since it
is equal to the communication overhead per client multiplying
by the number of chosen clients. In more detail, the incoming
data of the cloud server is exactly the total outgoing data of
all chosen clients, and vice verse. Additionally, we also do not
plot for different dropout ratios because this factor has little
impact on the bandwidth cost.
One key observation from Fig. 5(a) is that our secure
federated submodel learning can significantly reduce the total
communication overhead, compared with secure federated
learning. In particular, when the number of chosen clients
is 100, the communication overheads per client per com-
munication round are 1.76MB, 2.33MB, 2.78MB, 3.40MB,
and 5.57MB in secure federated submodel learning with
CPP1, CPP2, CPP3, CPP4, and CPP5, respectively, reducing
93.72%, 91.65%, 90.06%, 87.81%, and 80.05% than secure
federated learning, which incurs 27.94MB per client per round.
Considering secure federated submodel learning with CPP5
share the same levels of security and privacy with secure
federated learning (i.e., Theorem 3), we can draw that our
secure scheme can reduce communication overhead even with
not scarifying any security or privacy. These results coincide
with our complexity analysis in Section V-B and Table III.
The second key observation from Fig. 5(a) is that for
secure federated submodel learning with a certain CPP, the
communication overhead per client increases with the number
of chosen clients n. In addition, for a certain number of chosen
clients, the communication overhead per client increases with
the serial number of CPP. We clarify the reasons by adopting
the detailed communication complexity formula of each client
from Section V-B: O(ns+(sp5+(n−1)sp6)(2d+1)). On one
hand, the communication complexity grows linearly with n.
On other other hand, it is increasing with p5 and p6, and thus
TABLE VI
COMMUNICATION AND COMPUTATION OVERHEADS OF THE CLIENT AND
THE CLOUD SERVER PER ROUND IN PRIVATE SET UNION.
#Chosen Clients n 20 40 60 80 100
Client’s Comm. Overhead (MB) 0.63 0.70 0.77 0.84 0.91
Client’s Comp. Overhead (s) 5.04 10.09 15.53 26.49 33.69
Server’s Comp. Overhead (s) 1.12 1.68 2.40 3.13 4.19
CPP5 is most communication expensive. Additionally, given
p5 +p6 = 1 for CPPs from CPP1 to CPP4 in Table V, we can
simplify the formula to O(ns + (s + (n − 2)sp6)(2d + 1)),
which increases with p6 for n > 2. From Table V, we can
see that p6 increases with the serial number of CPP, implying
a higher communication overhead as depicted in Fig. 5(a).
Intuitively, p6 denotes the probability that an index not in a
client’s real index set finally falls into the perturbed index
set and controls the size of the redundant/zero parameters to
be downloaded and securely uploaded. Thus, when the sum of
two probabilities is fixed, particularly p5+p6 = 1, the increase
of bandwidth cost due to introducing redundant parameters
exceeds the decrease due to discarding original parameters. In
other words, the introduced redundant parameters controlled
by p6 dominates the holistic trend of communication overhead.
We next introduce the pure versions of federated submodel
learning and conventional federated learning shown in Fig. 1
as another type of baselines, and investigate the expansion
factors due to the security and privacy guarantees. In particular,
the pure federated submodel learning (resp., federated learn-
ing) means that each client directly downloads her required
submodel (resp., the full model) from the cloud server, and
then uploads the submodel update and the count vector (resp.,
the full model update and the training set size) to the cloud
server. The communication overheads per client per round are
0.41MB and 20.70MB in the federated submodel learning and
federated learning, respectively, and are irrelevant with the
number of chosen clients. Compared with the pure version,
when the number of chosen clients is 100, the communi-
cation overhead of secure federated submodel learning with
CPP2 (resp., secure federated learning) expands 5.65× (resp.,
1.35×). Three major reasons account for a larger expansion
factor in secure federated submodel learning: (1) First is that
the bandwidth cost of pure federated submodel learning, as the
denominator, is much lower than, particularly 1.99% of, the
pure federated learning’s bandwidth cost; (2) second is that the
size of model parameters in secure federated learning is much
larger than that in secure federated submodel learning, which
can amortize the communication cost spent in transferring
security and privacy related parameters; and (3) third is that
secure federated submodel learning requires an extra process
of private set union to facilitate later index set perturbation.
We finally present the communication overhead per client
per round of our private set union protocol. Table VI lists the
detailed bandwidth cost. We can see that the communication
overhead per client in private set union increases linearly with
the number of chosen clients, roughly with an increase of
0.07MB per 20 clients. In addition, we can also see that our
private set union is communication efficient, and it only incurs
0.91MB when the number of chosen clients reaches 100.
These evaluation results conform to our complexity analysis
in Section V-B and Table III.
C. Computation Overhead
We now report the practical computation overhead, mainly
by investigating the effects of the number of chosen clients,
the choices of probability parameters, as well as the ratios of
dropout. To be consistent with our time complexity analysis,
the computation overhead here only includes the run time of
the client or the cloud server in executing the protocol but
ignores synchronization delay and the time overhead of testing
global model. Of course, given mobile clients are highly par-
allel in practice, the total run time per communication round
can be estimated by adding up the computation overheads of
the client and the cloud server shown here. In addition, testing
the global model per round costs the cloud server 32.12s.
We first show the computation overheads of the client and
the cloud server in our secure federated submodel learning
with different CPPs in Fig 5(b) and Fig 5(c), respectively. We
still introduce secure federated learning as a baseline. First, we
compare two figures and find that the computation overhead
per client is higher than that of the cloud server. For example,
in secure federated submodel learning with CPP2, when the
number of chosen clients is 100, the computation overheads
of the client and the cloud server are 71.80s and 11.31s,
respectively. In addition to the superiorities of hardware and
multiprocessing, under the synchronous architecture, the cloud
server actually takes up the entire computing resources of the
physical workstation alone, which are instead shared by all
n chosen clients simultaneously. These factors jointly account
for the differences between Fig 5(b) and Fig 5(c). Second, we
focus on a certain side, either the client or the cloud server,
and we can observe that her computation overhead grows with
the number of chosen clients or the serial number of CPP.
Here, we explain the reason by means of the detailed time
complexities in Section V-B. For example, the time complexity
of the client is O(n2s+n(sp5 +(n−1)sp6)(d+1)), which is
increasing with the number of chosen clients n as well as p5
and p6, where the latter explains why CPP5 is the most time-
consuming one among all CPPs. Regarding CPP1 to CPP4
where p5 +p6 = 1, we can simplify the complexity formula to
O(n2s+n(s+(n−2)sp6)(d+1)), which is increasing with p6
for n > 2. The intuition behind the above analysis is analogous
to that behind communication overhead, i.e., the size of
redundant/zero parameters dominates the holistic computation
overhead. Third, we compare our secure federated submodel
learning with secure federated learning, and can find that our
secure scheme significantly outperforms the baseline on both
the sides of the client and the cloud server. In particular, when
the number of chosen clients is 100, at the same security and
privacy levels, secure federated submodel learning with CPP5
reduces 85.02% and 72.51% of computation overheads than
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secure federated learning on the sides of the client and the
cloud server, respectively. When security and privacy become
weaker, the advantages of our scheme are more evident under
CPP1 to CPP4, e.g., CPP2 reduces 98.77% and 86.70% on
the sides of the client and the cloud server, respectively.
We next investigate the effect of the dropout ratio of
chosen clients and depict the evaluation results in Fig. 6.
Here, we mainly focus on the secure aggregation based stages
while ignoring the other stages which are irrelevant with
dropout. In addition, we fix the number of chosen clients
in each communication round at 100. Moreover, each client
can randomly go offline after sending the encrypted shares
of her private PRNG seed for the self mask and her private
key for the mutual mask to the other clients because only
this type of dropout behaviors introduce additional overhead.
In particular, live clients still incorporate the public keys of
dropped clients for mutual masks, and the cloud server must
perform an expensive recovery computation to remove these
mutual masks. The higher the dropout ratio is, the more costly
the recovery computation will be. This trend is clear in Fig. 6.
Last, we only report the computation overhead of the cloud
sever because dropped clients do not introduce additional
operation cost to live clients, like for communication overhead.
Of course, the case that more clients are dropped can mitigate
the competition for system resources, especially when the
number of chosen clients is large and the size of vector for
secure aggregation is large. For example, when the number of
chosen clients is 100 and the dropout ratio is 20%, for the
secure aggregations of weighted submodel updates and count
vectors in our secure scheme with CPP5, the computation
overhead per client reduces by 16.75% than the overhead in
the case of no dropout.
We further observe Fig. 6 more carefully. First, we compare
our secure scheme with secure federated learning in the stages
of obliviously summing submodel or full model updates. We
can find that our scheme significantly outperforms secure
federated learning at any dropout ratio. Specifically, when the
dropout ratio is 20%, our scheme with CPP2 and CPP5 reduce
91.33% and 73.55% of computation overhead, respectively.
Second, we examine our private set union protocol and can
see that it is quite efficient, even when the dropout ratio is
high. In particular, when the dropout ratio reaches 20%, the
computation overhead of the cloud server is 37.66s.
D. Memory and Disk Loads
We finally present the practical storage overheads of secure
federated submodel learning and secure federated learning,
including memory and disk loads. In particular, the materials
for private set union and secure aggregations of submodel/full
model updates and count vectors are stored in memory for
immediate use, whereas permanent answers of each client are
written into disk if necessary.
First is about memory overhead. The cloud server requires
the video memory of 551MB, mainly for testing the global
model at the end of each communication round, which is
the same for all schemes. In addition, when the number of
chosen clients is 100, and there is no dropout, the memory
overheads per client are 209MB and 281MB in our secure
federated submodel learning with CPP2 and CPP5, respec-
tively, reducing 59.40% and 45.43% than secure federated
learning. Correspondingly, the memory overheads of the cloud
server are 1.58GB and 3.15GB, respectively, reducing 81.88%
and 63.77% than secure federated learning. Furthermore, com-
pared with the pure version, the memory overheads of our
secure federated submodel learning with CPP2 and CPP5 only
slightly expand on the client’s side, and expand 1.19× and
2.38× on the cloud server’s side, respectively. In contrast, the
expansion factor is 4.60× on the cloud server’s side in secure
federated learning.
Regarding the disk load, only the client in our scheme with
CPP2, CPP3, and CPP4 needs to store her permanent answers
in index set perturbation for multiple communication rounds,
which roughly occupies the disk space of 280KB within the
total 5,000 rounds.
E. Summary and Discussion
The above evaluation results adequately demonstrate the
effectiveness and efficiency of our proposed secure federated
submodel learning as well as its superiority over the baselines
of conventional federated learning. Additionally, when the size
of the full model, depending on the full size of the goods
IDs in the e-commerce scenario, scales further to billions in
practice, it has no effect on the performance and overhead
of our scheme. This is because as analyzed in Section V-B
and summarized in Table III, the complexities of our scheme
are independent of the size of the full model. However, the
conventional federated learning framework, hinging on the full
model, will be too prohibitively inefficiently to be applicable.
VII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have proposed a new framework, called
secure federated submodel learning, for numerous clients
to effectively and efficiently train large-scale deep learning
models under the coordination of an untrusted cloud server
while keeping their user data private. We further have applied
our framework to the e-commerce recommendation scenario
of Alibaba, implemented a prototype system, and extensively
evaluated its performance over a Taobao dataset. Evaluation
results have validated practical feasibility.
APPENDIX
A. Fine-Tuning the Privacy Level of Secure Submodel Updates
Aggregation
We introduce how to enable each client to fine-tune the
privacy level of secure submodel updates aggregation by
analyzing the impacts of the probability parameters p5 and p6
on the probabilities of Event 1 and Event 2, i.e., p7 = p5(1−
p5)
nj,1−1(1− p6)nj,0 and p8 = (1− p5)nj,1(1− (1− p6)nj,0),
respectively. Without loss of generality, we consider three
different policies: (1) Fixing p5 and adjusting p6; (2) fixing p6
and adjusting p5; and (3) fixing p5 + p6 = 1. In particular, as
shown in Table V, we mainly adopted the first and the third
policies in our evaluation.
We first analyze p7 as follows: (1) If p5 is fixed, p7
decreases as p6 increases; (2) If p6 is fixed, the monotonicity
is nontrivial. We need to compute the derivative of p7 with
respect to p5, i.e.,
dp7
dp5
= (1− p5nj,1) (1− p5)nj,1−2 (1− p6)nj,0 .
Thus, if p5 < 1/nj,1, p7 increases as p5 increases; otherwise,
p7 decreases as p5 increases; (3) If p5 + p6 = 1, we first
simplify p7 into p5nj,0+1(1 − p5)nj,1−1. Then, we compute
the derivative of p7 with respect to p5 as
dp7
dp5
= (nj,0 + 1− (nj,0 + nj,1) p5) p5nj,0 (1− p5)nj,1−2 .
Hence, if p5 < (nj,0 + 1)/(nj,0 + nj,1), p7 increases as p5
increases; otherwise, p7 decreases as p5 increases.
We next analyze p8 as follows: (1) If p5 is fixed, p8 increases
as p6 increases; (2) If p6 is fixed, p8 decreases as p5 increases;
(3) If p5 +p6 = 1, we simplify p8 into (1−p5)nj,1(1−p5nj,0).
Thus, p8 decreases as p5 increases.
Finally, we can verify the above deductions by checking
the differences among CPPs and the changes in the resulting
privacy levels of secure submodel updates aggregation in
Table V, where the number of chosen clients is 100 (i.e.,
nj,0 + nj,1 = 100), and the number of chosen clients who
have an arbitrary goods ID from the union is 1.17 in average
(i.e., nj,0 = 98.83, nj,1 = 1.17).
B. γ-Level Stochastic Quantization and Weighted Average
We first briefly review the application of γ-level stochastic
quantization in secure federated submodel learning. Consid-
ering that the compression, federated averaging (or math-
ematically, weighted average/mean), and decompression of
submodel updates are element-wise, we thus just focus on the
update of one parameter. Here, we consider that the parameter
update and the count number from client i ∈ C are ∆w(i) ∈ R
and v(i) ≥ 0 ∈ Z, respectively, and the cloud server wants to
compute
∑
i∈C v
(i)∆w(i)/
∑
i∈C v
(i). In addition, we assume
that ∀i ∈ C,∆wmin ≤ ∆w(i) ≤ ∆wmax. Moreover, for γ-
level quantization, the interval from ∆wmin to ∆wmax should
be equally divided into γ − 1 segments, where the length of
each segment is ∆wunit = (∆wmax − ∆wmin)/(γ − 1). In
fact, to compress ∆w(i), client i needs to find the segment
that contains ∆w(i), and then takes either the starting index
or the ending index of the segment with probability (w.p.)
inversely proportional to the distance between ∆w(i) and the
starting or ending point. More specifically, ∆w(i) is mapped
into z(i) ∈ {0, 1, . . . , γ − 1}, where
z(i) =

⌊
∆w(i) −∆wmin
∆wunit
⌋
w.p.
⌈
∆w(i) −∆wmin
∆wunit
⌉
− ∆w
(i) −∆wmin
∆wunit
,⌈
∆w(i) −∆wmin
∆wunit
⌉
otherwise.
On one hand, we can compute that the expectation of z(i) is
∆w(i)−∆wmin
∆wunit
, which is denoted as z(i)∗ and will be consis-
tently used in our following derivations. On the other hand,
we can decompress z(i) and get the recovered parameter as
z(i)∆wunit + ∆wmin, the expectation of which is ∆w(i).
We next demonstrate that the weighted averaging operation
in the compression space will not introduce any bias/error. On
each client’s side, she compresses her parameter update into:
∀i ∈ C, z(i)∗ = ∆w
(i) −∆wmin
∆wunit
.
Then, she further weights z(i)∗ through multiplying by
v(i) (i.e., v(i)z(i)∗), and uploads the materials for se-
cure aggregation. On the cloud server’s side, she di-
vides the aggregate result
∑
i∈C v
(i)z(i)∗ by
∑
i∈C v
(i), gets∑
i∈C v
(i)z(i)∗/
∑
i∈C v
(i), and finally performs decompres-
sion as ∑
i∈C v
(i)z(i)∗∑
i∈C v(i)
∆wunit + ∆wmin
=
∑
i∈C v
(i) ∆w(i)−∆wmin
∆wunit∑
i∈C v(i)
∆wunit + ∆wmin
=
∑
i∈C v
(i)
(
∆w(i) −∆wmin
)∑
i∈C v(i)
+ ∆wmin
=
∑
i∈C v
(i)∆w(i)∑
i∈C v(i)
−
∑
i∈C v
(i)∆wmin∑
i∈C v(i)
+ ∆wmin
=
∑
i∈C v
(i)∆w(i)∑
i∈C v(i)
−∆wmin + ∆wmin
=
∑
i∈C v
(i)∆w(i)∑
i∈C v(i)
,
which is the same as the desired outcome in expectation.
In a nutshell, we can conclude that secure federated sub-
model learning does not introduce any error/bias under the
γ-level stochastic quantization mechanism.
C. Divergence of Conventional Federated Learning
The behavior of divergence has ever been observed due to
large local epoch numbers in [9], which initially proposed
the federated averaging algorithm. However, the local epoch
number in our evaluation is set to the minimum 1, which
cannot account for divergence here. As illustrated in Sec-
tion VI-A, the major reason is that conventional federated
learning inaccurately counts in the weights (i.e., the training
set sizes) of those clients who contribute zero/no updates
for some network parameters (e.g., some embedding vectors
in DIN) when computing the weighted average of the full
model updates. We examine an embedding vector for the
goods with ID 1 for example. We consider that 100 clients
are chosen, and assume that the sizes of their training sets are
all 300s. Additionally, only 10 samples in client 1’s training
set involves goods 1 while the samples of the other 99 clients
do not, which implies that only client 1 updates the embedding
vector for goods 1 while the others do not. After each client
trains locally for one epoch and uploads update, under the
conventional federated learning framework, the cloud server
will update the global model by adding 300/(300×100) = 1%
of the client 1’s update of the embedding vector, where the
total weights count in the training set sizes of the other
99 clients who contribute zero updates. In contrast, under
our federated submodel learning framework, the cloud server
will add 10/10 = 100% of the client 1’s update of the
embedding vector to the global model, where the weight of
client 1 along with the total weights only count in the size
of involved samples. By comparing with centralized training
using the same hyperparameters over all 100 clients’ data in
sequence for one epoch, which will update the global model
by adding 100% rather than 1% of the client 1’s update of
the embedding vector, we can find that federated averaging of
the full model updates may cause some network layers, which
do not involve each client’s whole training set, to be trained
in an inaccurate way. This further indicates that we should
leverage the fine-grained involved training set sizes (e.g., at the
level of individual embedding vector here) as weights like in
our federated submodel learning, rather than using the whole
training set size at the level of the full model as a unified
weight like in conventional federated learning. Of course, the
roughness and inaccuracy of conventional federated learning
are completely exposed in our e-commerce context, mainly
due to the high heterogeneity of user data. In particular, the full
size of goods and category IDs are huge, and different Taobao
users tend to have highly differentiated or even mutually
exclusive sets of goods and category IDs, thus involving and
updating different rows of the embedding matrix. Nevertheless,
in some other contexts, where user data and their truly required
submodels are not heterogenous enough, these shortcomings
may not appear. For example, in the natural language context
considered by Google, clients use a small vocabulary of size
10,000 for local training in Gboard, which is similar to the
full set of goods and category IDs but with a much smaller
scale. Therefore, for the embedding vector of a certain word,
federated averaging results of its updates using the size of
a client’s whole text samples and the size of the samples
involving this word may not differ too much.
D. Leakage of A Client’s Real Index Set in Multiple Commu-
nication Rounds and Countermeasures
We now introduce a privacy leakage that if a client partic-
ipates in multiple communication rounds of federated (sub-
model) learning even with the strongest security and privacy
guarantees, the cloud server, as an adversary, may reveal
a client’s real indices. We focus on client i with her real
index set S(i) and assume that client i participates in two
communication rounds, where the unions of chosen clients’
real index sets are denoted as U1 and U2, respectively. We note
that U1 and U2 are both revealed to the cloud server, no matter
whether in our secure federated submodel learning or in secure
federated learning. First, the leakages of U1 and U2 in secure
federated submodel learning are trivial. Regarding secure
federated learning, the cloud server can still learn U1 and U2
from two aggregate full model updates by filtering out those
indices with zero updates. Please see Fig. 2(a) for an intuition,
and refer to the proof of Theorem 3 for formal reasoning. Now,
the cloud server computes the intersection of U1 and U2, which
must contain S(i), i.e., S(i) ⊂ U1
⋂U2. Here, we can further
derive that: (1) if client i participates in more communication
rounds, due to the properties of the intersection operation, the
cloud server can narrow down the scope of S(i); (2) if the real
index sets of different clients are mutually exclusive, and the
cloud server selects totally different sets of clients (excluding
client i) in two communication rounds, then S(i) = U1
⋂U2.
To mitigate the above leakage, we give the following four
kinds of countermeasures. (1) First, we adopt the concept of
“period” introduced in Section IV-B2, where a period com-
prises multiple communication rounds, and within a certain
period, each client just uses his historical data in the previous
one period to participate in federated (submodel) learning. To
avoid the above leakage, we here enforce that each client is
only chosen to join in one communication round in one period.
Under such a circumstance, the cloud server only obtains U1
and knows S(i) ⊂ U1, but cannot further get U2 and more
unions to narrow down the scope of S(i). (2) Second, we adopt
the concept of “group”, where the clients in a group participate
in federated (submodel) learning together. For example, if
client i joins in a group of 50 clients, then the cloud server
may only learn the union of these 50 clients’ real index sets,
even if this group participates in an infinite number of com-
munication rounds. (3) Third is resorting to anonymization.
For example, a client can use pseudo identities to participate
in different communication rounds, which does not affect the
execution of secure federated (submodel) learning. However,
such an anonymization process breaks the linkability and thus
disables the intersection operation between U1 and U2 because
the cloud server does not know whether a specific client
participates in both communication rounds or not. (4) Last
is to let each client replace her real index set with a perturbed
index set to participate in federated (submodel) learning. More
specifically, just as index set perturbation in Algorithm 2, each
client only keeps part of her real indices, randomly adds some
other indices from the full index set or other clients’ indices in
her previously involved rounds, and thus generates a perturbed
index set locally. Even though a client is chosen for an infinite
number of communication rounds, the cloud server may only
reveal her perturbed index set.
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